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Deliberation erodes cooperative behavior — Even towards competitive out-groups, even when using a control condition, and even when eliminating selection bias

Everett, Jim A.C., Ingbretsen, Zach, Cushman, Fiery, Cikara, Mina (2017) Deliberation erodes cooperative behavior — Even towards competitive out-groups, even when using a control condition, and even when eliminating selection bias. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 73 . pp. 76-81. ISSN 0022-1031. (doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2017.06.014) (KAR id:73826)

Abstract

By many accounts cooperation appears to be a default strategy in social interaction. There are, however, several documented instances in which reflexive responding favors aggressive behaviors: for example, interactions with out-group members. We conduct a rigorous test of potential boundary conditions of intuitive prosociality by looking at whether intuition favors cooperation even towards competitive out-group members, and even in losses frames. Moreover, we address three major methodological limitations of previous research in this area: a lack of an unconstrained control condition; non-compliance with time manipulations leading to high rates of exclusions and thus a selection bias; and non-comprehension of the structure of the game. Even after eliminating participant selection bias and non-comprehension, we find that deliberation decreases cooperation: even in competitive contexts towards out-groups and even in a losses frame, though the differences in cooperation between groups was consistent across conditions. People may be intuitive cooperators, but they are not in- tuitively impartial.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1016/j.jesp.2017.06.014
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Psychology
Depositing User: Jim Everett
Date Deposited: 08 May 2019 19:36 UTC
Last Modified: 05 Nov 2024 12:36 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/73826 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

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