Must knowledge be grounded in epistemic foundations?

The nature of knowledge has been a problematic issue that has puzzled philosophers over centuries of enquiry. Many definitions however, encompass the notion of a ‘justified true belief’, although ‘Gettier cases’ (cited in Pritchard 2006) show many concerns regarding such a definition, a sound justification is usually seen as an essential component of what knowledge comprises of. The structure of justification is however, a problematic area within epistemology, as when one is asked how they are justified in their belief one is limited to choose between three alternatives. Firstly, that the belief is unsupported (and needs no further justification). Secondly, that the belief is supported by an infinite chain of justification (with no supporting justification appearing more than on one occasion) and thirdly, that the belief is supported by a circular chain of justification. The schools of thought that defend each of these answers are respectively called Foundationalism, Infinitism and Coherentism. In this assignment, these positions will be compared and evaluated in terms of whether knowledge does need foundational beliefs in order to be justifiable.