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Radical behaviourism and scientific frameworks: from mechanistic to relational accounts

Chiesa, Mecca (1992) Radical behaviourism and scientific frameworks: from mechanistic to relational accounts. American Psychologist, 47 (11). pp. 1287-1299. ISSN 0003-066X. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:34589)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)

Abstract

A substantial portion of B. F. Skinner's scholarship was devoted to developing methods and terms for a scientific study of behavior. Three concepts central to scientific accounts--cause, explanation, and theory--are examined to illustrate the distinction between mechanistic and relational frameworks and radical behaviorism's relationship to those frameworks. Informed by a scientific tradition that explicitly rejects mechanistic interpretations, radical behaviorism provides a distinctive stance in contemporary psychology. The present analysis suggests that radical behaviorism makes closer contact with the "new world view" advocated by physicists and philosophers of science than does much of contemporary psychology

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HV Social pathology. Social and public welfare > HV1568 Disability studies
Divisions: Divisions > Division for the Study of Law, Society and Social Justice > School of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research > Tizard
Depositing User: Jo Ruffels
Date Deposited: 10 Jul 2013 14:43 UTC
Last Modified: 16 Feb 2021 12:46 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/34589 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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