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On the Conceptual, Psychological, and Moral Status of Zombies, Swamp-Beings, and other 'Behaviourally Indistinguishable' Creatures

Tanney, Julia (2004) On the Conceptual, Psychological, and Moral Status of Zombies, Swamp-Beings, and other 'Behaviourally Indistinguishable' Creatures. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXIX (1). pp. 173-186. ISSN 0031-8205. E-ISSN 1933-1592. (doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00389.x) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:1239)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided.
Official URL
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/1199214...

Abstract

In this paper I argue that it would be unprincipled to withhold mental predicates from our behavioural duplicates however unlike us they are “on the inside”. My arguments are unusual insofar as they rely neither on an implicit commitment to logical behaviourism in any of its various forms nor to a verificationist theory of meaning. Nor do they depend upon prior metaphysical commitments or to philosophical “intuitions”. Rather, in assembling reminders about how the application of our consciousness and prepositional attitude concepts are ordinarily defended, I argue on explanatory and moral grounds that they cannot be legitimately withheld from creatures who behave, and who would continue to behave, like us. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research is a first-class, American philosophical journal with blind refereeing.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00389.x
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > School of Culture and Languages
Depositing User: Maureen Nunn
Date Deposited: 19 Dec 2007 18:49 UTC
Last Modified: 16 Nov 2021 09:40 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/1239 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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