On the Conceptual, Psychological, and Moral Status of Zombies, Swamp-Beings, and other 'Behaviourally Indistinguishable' Creatures

In this paper I argue that it would be unprincipled to withhold mental predicates from our behavioural duplicates however unlike us they are “on the inside”. My arguments are unusual insofar as they rely neither on an implicit commitment to logical behaviourism in any of its various forms nor to a verificationist theory of meaning. Nor do they depend upon prior metaphysical commitments or to philosophical “intuitions”. Rather, in assembling reminders about how the application of our consciousness and prepositional attitude concepts are ordinarily defended, I argue on explanatory and moral grounds that they cannot be legitimately withheld from creatures who behave, and who would continue to behave, like us. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research is a first-class, American philosophical journal with blind refereeing.