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Conceptual engineering should be empirical

Landes, Ethan (2025) Conceptual engineering should be empirical. Erkenntnis, . ISSN 0165-0106. E-ISSN 1572-8420. (In press) (doi:10.1007/s10670-025-00923-x) (KAR id:108936)

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Abstract

Conceptual engineering is a philosophical method that aims to design and spread conceptual and linguistic devices to cause meaningful changes in the world. So far, however, conceptual engineers have struggled to successfully spread the conceptual and linguistic entities they have designed to their target communities. This paper argues that conceptual engineering is far more likely to succeed if it incorporates empirical data and empirical methods. Because the causal factors influencing the successful propagation of linguistic or conceptual devices are as complicated and interwoven as they are, proper empirical research will greatly boost the likelihood that propagation is successful. In arguing for the superiority of empirical conceptual engineering over armchair-based conceptual engineering, this paper proposes a framework for understanding the causal forces at play in propagation. This is a three-part framework between the label of a lexical item, the psychological states associated with the lexical item, and the worldly things associated with the lexical item. By understanding the way causal forces affecting propagation play out at these three levels, conceptual engineers can better conceptualize, study, and harness the different causal forces affecting the success of their conceptual engineering projects.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1007/s10670-025-00923-x
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology > BF41 Psychology and philosophy
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Psychology
Funders: Swiss National Science Foundation (https://ror.org/00yjd3n13)
Depositing User: Ethan Landes
Date Deposited: 03 Mar 2025 11:27 UTC
Last Modified: 04 Mar 2025 12:02 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/108936 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

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