Whole-of-society approach or manufacturing intelligence? Making sense of state-CSO relation in preventing and countering violent extremism in Nigeria

The boundaries of partnership between states and civil society organisations (CSOs), as well as who is counted and who gets to set them, have been the subject of ongoing debate. This discussion has gained particular significance in light of the growing securitisation and tactical engagement of CSOs in conflict, violence, and security. The discussion has led to the development of a theoretical framework known as “strategic exclusion, co-option, and containment” (SECC). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, the importance of normative inquiries notwithstanding, there exists a dearth of contextual and empirical understanding regarding the dynamics of state-CSO interactions. To address this gap, this study examines the interactions between states and Muslim community-based CSOs in the implementation of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). The research draws from an ethnographic study involving various actors, including policymakers, security agents, non-state P/CVE practitioners, civil society group members, P/CVE donor-agency programme managers, and P/CVE coalition networks and steering committee members. The study argues that in the context of P/CVE, where a “whole-of-society” approach is promoted, the state utilises Muslim community-based CSOs primarily as intelligence producers to advance its interests, thereby undermining their agency in P/CVE practices. Despite its framing as a human security perspective on violent extremism, the whole-of-society approach in P/CVE remains deeply rooted in state-security logic and the continuation of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) practices. This ultimately constricts the spaces of engagement between the state and civil society.