University of Kent

Kent Academic Repository

Akintayo, Joshua (2024) *Whole-of-society approach or manufacturing intelligence? Making sense of state-CSO relation in preventing and countering violent extremism in Nigeria*. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 17 (3). pp. 659-683. ISSN 1753-9153.

Downloaded from

https://kar.kent.ac.uk/106315/ The University of Kent's Academic Repository KAR

The version of record is available from

https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2024.2360272

This document version

Publisher pdf

DOI for this version

Licence for this version

CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives)

Additional information

Versions of research works

Versions of Record

If this version is the version of record, it is the same as the published version available on the publisher's web site. Cite as the published version.

Author Accepted Manuscripts

If this document is identified as the Author Accepted Manuscript it is the version after peer review but before type setting, copy editing or publisher branding. Cite as Surname, Initial. (Year) 'Title of article'. To be published in ***Title of Journal*** , Volume and issue numbers [peer-reviewed accepted version]. Available at: DOI or URL (Accessed: date).

Enquiries

If you have questions about this document contact ResearchSupport@kent.ac.uk. Please include the URL of the record in KAR. If you believe that your, or a third party's rights have been compromised through this document please see our Take Down policy (available from https://www.kent.ac.uk/guides/kar-the-kent-academic-repository#policies).



Critical Studies on Terrorism

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/rter20

Whole-of-society approach or manufacturing intelligence? Making sense of state-CSO relation in preventing and countering violent extremism in Nigeria

Joshua Akintayo

To cite this article: Joshua Akintayo (31 May 2024): Whole-of-society approach or manufacturing intelligence? Making sense of state-CSO relation in preventing and countering violent extremism in Nigeria, Critical Studies on Terrorism, DOI: 10.1080/17539153.2024.2360272

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2024.2360272

© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

Published online: 31 May 2024.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 122

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rter20

CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM
https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2024.2360272

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

OPEN ACCESS Check for updates

Whole-of-society approach or manufacturing intelligence? Making sense of state-CSO relation in preventing and countering violent extremism in Nigeria

Joshua Akintayo

School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK

ABSTRACT

The boundaries of partnership between states and civil society organisations (CSOs), as well as who is counted and who gets to set them, have been the subject of ongoing debate. This discussion has gained particular significance in light of the growing securitisation and tactical engagement of CSOs in conflict, violence, and security. The discussion has led to the development of a theoretical framework known as "strategic exclusion, co-option, and containment" (SECC). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, the importance of normative inquiries notwithstanding, there exists a dearth of contextual and empirical understanding regarding the dynamics of state-CSO interactions. To address this gap, this study examines the interactions between states and Muslim community-based CSOs in the implementation of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). The research draws from an ethnographic study involving various actors, including policymakers, security agents, non-state P/CVE practitioners, civil society group members, P/CVE donor-agency programme managers, and P/CVE coalition networks and steering committee members. The study argues that in the context of P/CVE, where a "whole-of-society" approach is promoted, the state utilises Muslim community-based CSOs primarily as intelligence producers to advance its interests, thereby undermining their agency in P/CVE practices. Despite its framing as a human security perspective on violent extremism, the whole-of-society approach in P/CVE remains deeply rooted in state-security logic and the continuation of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) practices. This ultimately constricts the spaces of engagement between the state and civil society.

ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 12 January 2024
Accepted 21 May 2024

KEYWORDS
P/CVE; Nigeria; whole-of-society; and SECC framework

Introduction

In 2017, Nigeria implemented the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (NAPCVE) as part of its response to the growing spate of political violence and violent extremism, whose effects are felt most acutely in the Northeast, Middle Belt, and Southern regions of Nigeria. The plan, based on whole-of-government and whole-of-society[1] approaches, emphasised the importance of partnership, inclusivity, and collaboration

CONTACT Joshua Akintayo akintayojosh@gmail.com

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

© 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.

between state and civil society organisations (CSOs) (NAPCVE 2017). Apart from acknowledging that CSOs play pivotal roles in addressing social, cultural, and political drivers of violence, the approaches also emphasised the prioritisation of state-CSO partnership and collaboration as panaceas to addressing violent extremism, including the contexts and dynamics that enable extremist ideas to emerge, grow, and be sustained (NAPCVE 2017).

The scholarly literature on the implementation of counter-terrorism measures (CTMs) underscores state-CSO engagement (Howell 2014; Howell and Lind 2010; Njoku 2021a). While these studies highlight the importance of incorporating Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), scholars are also beginning to pay attention into ways which States consider CSOs to be legitimate or illegitimate partners in the implementation of counter-terrorism measures (CTMs), the roles they play, and more recently, the range of strategic and tactical options States utilise in engaging civil non-state actors in the implementation of CTMs. These measures include overt repressive tactics commonly used in hard counter-terrorism practices, as well as covert actions such as exclusionary policies, co-option, control and containment practices, and duality of coercion (Njoku 2021a, Daucé 2015; Howell 2014; Howell and Lind 2010). Similarly, despite the emphasis on the importance of collaboration between the state and civil society in P/CVE processes (Kundnani and Hayes 2018; Ucko 2018), there have been insufficient studies that account for the intricate dynamics that shape these relationships and engagements. To put it differently, we know little about the complex ways that non-Western states involve CSOs in P/CVE processes, as well as the ramifications of these relations. This implies that our understanding of P/CVE in these contexts remains limited.

The main objective of this article revolves around elucidating the nuanced dynamics inherent in the interplay between the state CSOs. Thus, the article asks: what the nature of state-CSO relations is in Nigeria's P/CVE processes and to what extent the dynamic of this relation practically epitomises its policy rhetoric. Are the relations based on truly whole-of -society or is it a case of CSOs being used as instruments to serve state interests? Drawing on ethnographic field research conducted in terrorism-affected states in Northern-Eastern Nigeria and Abuja from October 2022 to September 2023, the article argues that the Nigerian government discreetly categorises CSOs into two groups: those that are seen as friendly, which are called "friendly agents" (Njoku 2021a), and those that voice criticism against the state and its actions. Subsequently, the government utilises these categorised friendly agents within the Muslim community-based CSOs as sources of intelligence from communities in less conspicuous ways through the whole-of-society approach and its neoliberal principles of partnership, collaboration, and inclusivity. The article further contends that while this strategic engagement impinges on CSOs' agential capacity to contest the dynamics of the lopsided relation, the challenging operational environment that CSOs encounter, including limited access to funding (Njoku 2020a, 2022a), facilitates this continued instrumentalization by the state. Thus, enabling states deploy discursive construction of "good" and "bad" CSOs as shorthand for donor darlings and donor orphans, followed by a dual-prong approach of co-opting and containing good and bad CSOs. The article further asserts that the underlying rationale driving this mechanism is based on viewing P/CVE as a state security rather than human security project. This perspective is heavily influenced by the institutional architecture coordinating the project, the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA), and its institutional legacy of hard-security measures that limit interaction between the state and society.

In other words, central to this investigation is an exploration into the extent to which governmental policies concerning P/CVE genuinely embraces a commitment to inclusivity, as underscored by principles of pluralism, neutrality, and independence. In make this argument, the article draws upon claims in the critical discourse on state-civil society relations which cast scepticism on the purported autonomy of CSOs, which is based on the idea of pluralistic partnerships between state and society. It posits that when the state and CSOs collaborate harmoniously, the state gains an advantageous position and consistently tries to exert influence over CSOs to advance its own interests. Thus, I bring these debates into conversation with the theoretical underpinnings of the Strategic exclusion, co-option, and containment (SECC) framework to facilitate a nuanced understanding of the multifaceted dimensions characterising state-CSO interactions in context of P/CVE[2] in Nigeria

The article makes three notable contributions: First, it contributes, empirically, to scholarship on preventing and countering violent extremism in Nigeria by rigorously examining governmental policies and practices in relation to CSOs involved in P/CVE initiatives to uncover the gaps between rhetoric and reality in the implementation of P/CVE strategies. By closely examining how CSOs are integrated into state-led initiatives, the article seeks to determine whether their involvement is a genuine commitment to pluralism, neutrality, and independence or if it is a form of co-optation to serve state interests. Second, this article aims to make a practical contribution to the field by offering nuanced insights into the complexities and contradictions of state-CSO relations. By adopting a critical perspective that scrutinises both state and CSO practices, the article aims to reveal the structural inequalities and power dynamics that often underpin seemingly collaborative efforts. Ultimately, by unpacking the intricacies of state-CSO interactions in the context of P/CVE, this article seeks to inform policy discourse and contribute to the development of more equitable and effective strategies for countering violent extremism. Third, in drawing upon the SECC framework, the article facilitates theoretical reflections and enriches its relevance as an explanatory framework for analysing states' behaviour towards non-state actors in contemporary security governance strategies and partnerships. Furthermore, it provides empirical evidence of its explanatory relevance in understanding how states engage and collaborate with CSOs in security governance, conflict, violence, and peace. The study expands the framework's empirical application beyond Western contexts to non-Western contexts.

The article is organised around five sections. The first section delves briefly into the existing arguments in the literature on the manifestations underlying implementing P/CVE measures on state-society relations. In the second section, I elucidate the SECC framework, which serves as the theoretical foundation of the study and is crucial for understanding Nigeria's P/CVE and its whole-of-society approach. The third section provides an overview of P/CVE in Nigeria, while the fourth section explores the empirical evidence of the contradictory logic underpinning the practice of the whole-of-society approach, and how it functions as an avenue through which the Nigerian state strategically engages CSOs based on their perceived capability to provide intelligence and its alignment with state interests. I conclude by reiterating the importance of studying the implementation and implications of P/CVE measures on the state-CSO relationship through the SECC framework.

Review of the literature

The scholarship on the diverse manifestations of implementing P/CVE measures on state-society relations are built around three main assumptions. First, scholars argue that P/CVE plays a securitising task, specifically in Muslim communities (Heath-Kelly 2013; Kundnani 2009; Kundnani and Hayes 2018; Pantazis and Pemberton 2009; Sian 2015; Stanley, Guru, and Coppock 2020). The principal arguments within this praxis analyse P/CVE's strong monocultural focus on specific ethnic and religious identities, constituting them as security threats and subsequently seeking ways to manage them (O'Toole et al. 2016; Thomas 2016). By so doing, the approach securitised religious and ethnic identities and provided the ideological foundation for the reinterpretation of the approach as Islamophobia (Abbas 2012; Abbas and Awan 2015). Hence, this was used to justify the discursive construction of alienating narratives such as suspect communities and "suspect categories" (Shanaah 2022, Breen-Smyth 2014; Taylor 2020). Showing similarities with Howell and Lind's argument on categorising CSOs into good and bad, the securitising practice of P/CVE in contexts such as the UK, Kenya (Howell and Lind 2010), and Australia has been used to segregate populations into "good" and "bad," 'risky, and "safe" on a different basis, in turn facilitating the practice of state-society engagements in a securitised clime (Abdel-Fattah 2020; Pantazis and Pemberton 2009; Spalek and Imtoual 2007). Consequently, these practices of securitised engagements were perpetuated by capitalising on P/CVE's pre-emptive and anticipatory logic. Within this view, studies argue that sparingly, the P/CVE agenda has been used as cover to perpetuate human rights abuses similar to the hard-power approach of counterterrorism and inadvertently contributing to rather than countering violent extremism (Breidlid 2021, Rosand et al. 2018). Remarkably, Rosand, et al. (2018) contend that in some guises, P/CVE is driven via a state-security logic lens contrary to the principle of human security that P/CVE and its soft approach champions.

Second, as scholars discussed, is the skewed interface between government and CSOs in P/CVE. Scholars posit that despite the focus of P/CVE being the incorporation of non-state actors to prevent people from becoming involved in violent extremism, there still exists a lack of coordination between most governments and CSOs. According to Sumpter (2017), in Indonesia, the CVE engagement between the government remains top-down, fragmented, and lacking direction. Similarly, Agastia, Perwita, and Subedi (2020) argue that despite possessing socially solid ties to people and occupying a unique place to reach out to the seemingly unreachable people in violent contexts, CSOs in Indonesia are rarely involved in the country's deradicalisation programmes.

Furthermore, it has been argued that the various engagements and collaborations facilitated under the rubric of P/CVE between state and CSOs/communities compel and coerce participation on the side of non-state actors (Mesok 2022). For instance, Mesok argues that P/CVE in Kenya produces police power, and governments utilise the whole-of-society approach to mobilise, ensure, and compel acquiescence from communities and citizens. Relatedly, P/CVE state-society engagements are latently used to justify expanding the state's surveillance and intelligence – the ethos of intelligence provision in state-society engagement. On the one hand, P/CVE ensures that ethnic and religious communities are sometimes under security surveillance based on subjective predictive factors known to security actors alone. Hence, implying that states engagement of CSOs in P/CVE

is a shorthand for intelligence gathering (Kaleem 2022, Nguyen 2019; Patel and Koushik 2017; Rosand et al. 2018). Scholars contend that states achieve this by drawing on discourses that propel the relevance of CSOs in P/CVE activities, such as elevating them to security deputies and stakeholder security actors (Jarvis and Lister 2010). States systematically embed surveillance and intelligence-generating practices into partnerships/collaborations with CSOs (Kundnani and Hayes 2018). For instance, Monaghan asserts that efforts to counter violent extremism in Canada birth security governance and surveillance practices that monitor specific populations at risk (Monaghan 2014). Similarly, scholars have raised deep concerns about how P/CVE efforts legitimise the intensification of surveillance techniques and facilitate the expansion of state-security dynamics, which produced new discourses that have become standardised and sustained in the various counterterrorism strategies of national governments (Valverde 2011). Within this view, Monaghan contends that through discourses of the "whole of government" in Canada's counterterrorism strategy, security governance networks such as the Countering Violent Extremism Working Group (CVEWG) continue to perpetuate overt securitisation of Islam. The CVEWG, according to Monaghan, "produce definitions, categories of threats, caricatures of extremism and radicals, and conceptualisation of danger" (Monaghan 2014, 495).

The preceding discussion illuminates the growing state-society intersection in P/CVE processes. Predominantly, it expands the discourse beyond prosaic narratives which emphasise that States repressively engage CSOs in the implementation of P/CVE. Instead, it elucidates the range of engagement patterns strategically available to and utilised by different states. Overall, while these scholarly works have aided in advancing the knowledge of the nuances of state-CSO relations in countering violent extremism, scholarly findings on the implications of P/CVE on state-CSO relations still remain limited. Specifically, little is known about the various mechanisms of co-option that states use in strategically engaging CSOs in P/CVE from the West African context, as well as the effects of the co-option mechanisms on P/CVE implementation. This study, therefore, examines the mechanisms and effects of State's co-option of CSOs in the P/CVE space using Nigeria as a critical case. Nigeria is a critical case for the following reasons. Firstly, the significance placed on Nigeria is indicative of the wider Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) literature, which highlights the need to expand critical knowledge on terrorism in Africa and prioritise insights from the global South and African countries (Atta 2023; Dan Suleiman 2023; Njoku 2021a; Oando and Achieng' 2021). Secondly, the focus on Nigeria is further emphasised due to the rise of terrorism studies that rely heavily on problem-solving approaches (Chukwuma 2022). This trend is characterised by reductionist discourses, which according to Husle and Spencer (2008), are centred on the terrorist actor and perpetuate an uncritical dimension to counter-terrorism debates in Nigeria (Njoku 2021a). This deficiency in CT research findings has fed into existing CT policies and securitises non-state civil actors (Njoku 2022a). Thirdly, the slow progress in reviewing Nigeria's overarching P/CVE policy document, NAPCVE, and the domestication of State Action Plans (SAPs) adds to the criticality of the situation. Despite being one of the first African countries to introduce a national variant of the global P/CVE agenda, the review of the NAPCVE since its inception in 2017 has been slow, uninspiring, and complicated by political contestations. Therefore, there is a need for sustained reflection that critically analyses and unpacks the nature of implementation of P/CVE.

Theoretical framework: the strategic exclusion, co-option, and containment (SECC) framework

Before discussing what the SECC framework has to offer to the debates on P/CVE in Nigeria, it is important to briefly clarify what is understood by SECC and P/CVE, and how both are invoked in this article. The SECC framework emerged as an attempt to integrate various disparate perspectives and patterns of state-CSO relations, by further elucidating the complex interaction between the concepts and factors shaping the relations. The framework expands on existing concepts and highlights strategic exclusion and ambiguity as key elements, leading to the de-legitimisation and transformation of CSOs into government-controlled entities (Njoku 2022b). Relatedly, I approach P/CVE as a policy spectrum encompassing a range of non-coercive attempts and intervention aimed at reducing involvement in terrorism and violent extremism (Harris-Hogan, Barrelle, and Zammit 2016). Its emphasis on non-coercive and soft approach to challenging ideas, beliefs, and behaviours that exemplify violent extremism facilitates the interaction between state and non-state actors (Gielen 2017; Van Ginkel 2017).

With the above in mind, I then move to applying the framework to P/CVE by asking: How does the application of the Strategic Exclusion, Co-option, and Containment (SECC) framework elucidate the intricacies involved in the conceptualisation, formulation, and execution of Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) strategies within the Nigerian context? To what extent can the SECC framework, when employed within the Nigerian P/CVE paradigm, offer insights into the nuanced dynamics of state-civil society organisation (CSO) relations, given the diverse nature of CSOs and the varying socio-political landscapes across different regions within Nigeria?

The SECC framework is rooted in the extant theoretical positions of the scholarship on state-CSO partnership, specifically, in the works of the scholars from the liberationist perspective of state-CSO partnership such as John Clark, Michael Edwards, David Hulme, and Alan Fowler (Clark 1995, Edwards and Hulme, 1992; Fowler 1992). The liberationist perspective contests and criticises the functionalist position of a healthy and beneficial state-CSO partnership. According to the liberationist position, the relationship between the state and CSOs is often strained due to the state's tendency to influence CSOs to act in its own interests, even if it goes against the principles of the CSOs. Hence, the liberationist perspective debunks the functionalist standpoint of a synergetic state-CSO partnership. Basically, Clark's critique confronts the functionalist perspective on state – CSO relations, which posits that these relationships should be founded on "mutual respect, recognition of autonomy, independence, and diversity of NGO perspectives and positions." He states that the actions of the state, whether it is "interventionist, active encouragement, partnership, co-option and control", can negatively affect the health of CSOs (Clark 1995, 598). Fowler argues that some governments are apprehensive about the emergence of civil society organisations (CSOs) because they fear it could undermine their authority. In other words, liberationists argue about the pathology of partnership and how States would ultimately use CSOs as vendors to advance their interest while undermining CSOs' stated objectives, consequently calling into question the nature of relationship that emerges from the partnership (Fowler 1992).

In reiterating the above standpoint, Jude Howell and Jeremy Lind jointly and individually invoked the liberationist logic of a disadvantageous partnership between state and CSOs, to argue that States adopt a dual-pronged strategy of co-option and control in their engagement with CSOs. In their analysis of counter terrorism measures (CTMs) in Afghanistan, India, the UK, and Kenya, they highlighted that these states utilise a strategic co-option and control approach in categorising CSOs into good and bad groups (Howell and Lind 2010). Further underscoring this logic of co-option, and control, scholars such as Daucé, Skokova, Pape, and Krasnopolskaya, Brechenmacher and Carothers, as well as Njoku differently theorised the state-CSOs relations in contexts such as Russia and Nigeria as the "duality of coercion", "confrontation and co-optation", "managed civil society", and "strategic exclusion" (Njoku 2021b, Brenchenmacher 2017, Dauce 2015; Krasnopolskaya, Skokova, and Pape 2015). These studies highlight the liberationists' critical viewpoints on how State-CSOs relations was ultimately skewed to the disadvantage of CSOs to the point where governments engage CSOs to undertake service provision duties at the expense of advocacy.

The SECC framework was developed by Njoku to integrate all perspectives and patterns of state-CSOs relations into a comprehensible theory (Njoku 2022b). Drawing on the works of Howell, Lind, Dauce, Skokova, Krasnopolskaya, Brenchenmacher, and Carothers, Njoku's SECC underscores the liberationist position and provides explanation for the likelihood of the complex interaction between the varying factors. The framework widens the analytical scope of Howell and Lind's co-option and containment and Njoku's strategic exclusion concepts in explaining the relations between states and CSOs in counterterrorism (Njoku 2021b; Howell and Lind 2010). Njoku argues that "a range of strategic options are open to the state in their attempt to manage and regulate CSOs and transforming them into relays of power" (Njoku 2022b, 918). Amongst these options are strategic ambiguity and strategic exclusion. Intimately intertwined, the concepts of strategic exclusion and strategic ambiguity are bedrocks of the SECC framework. Despite being crucial to foregrounding the framework, the concepts have been deployed across disciplines like international organisations, international law, and peacebuilding (De Coning 2018; Hummel 2015; Thiessen 2022; Wilkinson 2005) to capture the complexity of practices of actors such as national governments, regional and international actors. For instance, Thiessen (2022), used the concept of strategic ambiguity to highlight the discrepancy between expectations of external actors and local population regarding PVE and peacebuilding measures in Kyrgyzstan. A perspective that permeates these different fields is that the utilisation of the notions of strategic ambiguity and strategic exclusion reflects the various intricacies underlying the State's conduct towards non-state actors. Put more succinctly, strategic exclusion refers to the systematic non-inclusion, selective inclusion, and or partial engagement of non-state actors, such as CSOs, in the formulation of laws and policies. This exclusion, which is aimed, among other things, at curtailing the ability of these actors to nip in the bud the various problematic components of the laws, effectively gives States the leverage to entrench hegemonic acts and perpetuate repressive practices. Similarly, the notion of strategic ambiguity denotes the underlying opacity and abstruseness inherent in the communication of policy discourses and narratives by States. The ambiguity allows States multiple ways to frame and interpret issues and consequently escape any responsibility and associated consequences.

The SECC framework suggests that states frame counterterrorism laws and policies vaguely, allowing the State to subjectively define and redefine the involvement of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in counterterrorism activities (Njoku 2022b). This ambiguity discourages, restricts, and excludes CSOs, leading to strategic exclusion. The framework also has constitutive effects on state-society relations, such as de-legitimatisation, criminalisation of political advocacy, and a premium on service delivery. It also transforms NGOs to General Non-Governmental Organizations (GONGOs) at three levels: engaging with CSOs who share similar ideals, infiltrating government actors into CSO governing structures to control and supervise their conduct and establishing new CSOs as outlets for advancing government policies. This transformation occurs at three levels, highlighting the complex relationship between state-society relations and the role of CSOs in counterterrorism efforts (Njoku 2022b).

The SECC framework sheds light on the weaknesses of existing approaches to state-society relations in counterterrorism. It provides new avenues to unpack the systematic pattern of state securitisation of CSOs within CT. However, despite these positives, the SECC framework exudes some shortcomings. Specifically, the generalisability of the framework has been highlighted to be undermined by factors such as variations in state behaviour, variations in the nature of CSOs, and variations in socio-political contexts. Disparities exist in how the government co-opts and controls CSOs in counterterrorism. For instance, the SECC framework does not account for the Nigerian socio-political context where P/CVE has been implemented. Hence, Njoku calls for more empirical works that test the extent of the generalisability of the framework. The article argues that while the SECC framework provides us with a theoretical basis for understanding how States strategically engage CSOs to co-opt and control them, its comprehensibility and relevance remain abstract and in need of empirical elucidation. Precisely, it is argued that there is merit in empirically unpacking the framework and teasing out its analytical utility due to its penchant to unearth the various seemingly subtle mechanisms of co-option deployed by States to co-opt CSOs which appear unproblematic on the surface, as well as the effects of States strategic co-option of CSOs on security measures and policies. Therefore, grasping the nuances resulting from States strategic co-option of CSOs in P/CVE is analytically fruitful in continued scholarly effort in theorising states' behaviour towards CSOs in security governance. Thus, the article argues that the SECC framework allows for a detailed analysis of how the principles of inclusivity, participation and collaboration, which are central to P/CVE's whole-of-society approach, are ambiguously utilised by the Nigerian government to facilitate practices that involve excluding, co-opting, and controlling CSOs.

Background: preventing and countering violent extremism in Nigeria

The beginning of the current decade has witnessed a sprouting P/CVE structure in Nigeria. On the one hand, this advancement can be attributed to the authorities' experience with long-standing political violence of varying nature in Nigerian society. On the other hand is the new challenge posed by home-grown Jihadism and the need to handle it. Nevertheless, it is possible to highlight three decisive steps in developing a Nigerian P/CVE capacity. Nigerian experiments with P/CVE-type endeavours date back to 2014, when the government, through the Office of the National Security Adviser, began to make

efforts to commence a soft-approach response to terrorism. This first step, aimed at re-evaluating its counterterrorism responses and efforts, led to the launch of the first counterterrorism strategy called the National Counterterrorism Strategy, commonly called the NACTEST (NACTEST 2014).[3] The NACTEST emphasised the importance of a soft approach to terrorism: countering violent extremism (CVE). The CVE essentially had a three-pronged approach: to counter radicalisation to violent extremism, to promote strategic communication to counter violent extremism and the deradicalisation of terrorists.

The second step came in 2017, adopting and launching a National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (NAPCVE). The NAPCVE was adopted and implemented in response to the UN Secretary-General's request for the creation of a national plan of action to counter violent extremism by tackling the underlying factors at the local level (UN General Assembly, 2015). Therefore, nations in the developing regions of the world, particularly in Africa, actively embraced the implementation and utilisation of measures to prevent and combat violent extremism. Despite the expectation that these strategies would facilitate a contextualised approach to tackle the local aspects of violent extremism, scholars note that external dominance continually overshadows local P/CVE interventions because they are based on existing western templates (Badurdeen 2023; Cucu 2023, Oyawale 2023; Simoncini 2020). Specifically, these strategies have further strengthened the cascading influence of donor-led P/CVE efforts in the South to shape both government and CSO agendas. For instance, both governments and CSOs shape their P/CVE policy and practice by mirroring neoliberal rhetorical constructions linking vulnerability and security threats in order to access donor funding (Badurdeen 2023; Letsch 2023; Simoncini 2020). The framework seeks to achieve four main objectives: institutionalise, mainstream, and coordinate P/CVE programmes at the national, state, and local levels; strengthen an accessible justice system and respect for human rights and the rule of law; enhance the capacity of individuals and communities to prevent and counter violent extremism and recover from violent incidents; institutionalise, mainstream, and integrate strategic communication in P/CVE programmes at all levels.[4] These policies aptly embody the Nigerian government's approach to violent extremism and terrorism from a less-violent perspective. This step is closely embedded in establishing a P/CVE unit within the National Counterterrorism Centre. The task given to the P/CVE unit was to coordinate the implementation of Nigeria's Policy Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism.

The third step was in 2017 through the launch of the National Policy Framework on demobilisation, deradicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR). The framework, which comprises five components, operationalises and harmonises all deradicalisation activities and processes of the Nigerian government. While this framework supports the need for domesticating instruments to implement DDRR at sub-national levels, there is yet to be any comprehensive attempt by the conflict-affected state governments to domesticate DDRR. In 2022, the Borno state government rolled out a semblance of a domesticated version of the national policy framework on DDRR.[5]

A central plank underlying these approaches and the extant policies is the focus and reliance on the involvement of non-state civilian actors, expressed through various concepts. The Nigerian P/CVE adoption of a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach comprehensively underlines these discourses and concepts. The blending of

these two discourses in Nigeria's P/CVE strategies underscores the resolve of the Nigerian government to embrace and prioritise the inclusion and engagement of civilian non-state actors in implementing these approaches. The centrality of the whole-of-society approach has been explicitly and implicitly reinforced in the Nigerian government's P/CVE policy documents. However, despite the strong rhetorical insistence on engaging CSOs, contentions remain around how the Nigerian government pursues its state-CSO relations in CT/CVE. The government adopts a more restrictive and security-focused stance on the activities of CSOs (Njoku 2020b, 2021b). This raises questions about the mechanism underlying the "whole-of-society" approach to getting CSOs involved in P/CVE-specific and related efforts.

Method

This article is part of the author's doctoral research on Terrorist Deradicalization and Muslim Communities in Northeastern Nigeria, which included a dataset of over 50 participants, which adopted ethnographic observation and interviewing. The author's approach to this subject is critical in nature, emphasising the political impact and subjectivities that underlie terrorism and counterterrorism rhetoric, and exploring how such rhetoric is employed, as well as the socio-political ramifications that ensue (Jackson 2007). This critical perspective informs the conduct, analysis, and writing of the article. Data for this article was sourced from interviews conducted with past and present government P/CVE policy actors, security agents, non-state P/CVE practitioners, including members of Civil society groups, programme managers of P/CVE donor-agencies, as well as members of P/CVE coalition networks and steering committee. The participants, which included non-state P/CVE practitioners, civil society group members, and P/CVE donor agency programme managers, had activities that covered various thematic programme foci such as peacebuilding and development, youth, peace and security, gender-based violence, and security-sector reform. Furthermore, most interviewed CSOs and CBOs received funding and financial support through international donors and their various instruments. These participants were selected purposively and through snowball sampling. The field research for the study was carried out between October 2022 and September 2023. The location of the field research was Abuja, Nigeria. This location was selected due to its strategic importance as the operational base of government P/CVE activities, civil society organisations, international non-governmental organisations, and the headquarters of security agencies involved in CVE activities.

The interviews were both structured and unstructured depending on the type of respondent. However, questions were drawn thematically on the roles of the respondent in P/CVE, the nature of Nigeria's P/CVE programme, the involvement of other actors in P/CVE, the effects of P/CVE activities on their respective organisations, the challenges encountered in implementing P/CVE measures, and the efforts in addressing some of the challenges. This approach allowed for follow-up questions that enabled conversations around the intricacies of the whole-of-society approach to P/CVE in Nigeria. Due to this, some of the participants did not allow to be voice recorded, but only preferred notes taken. Regardless, some participants allowed their interviews recorded. The qualitative data gathered were thematically and content analysed. The recorded conversations were transcribed and anonymised in

consonance with the notes taken. The researcher developed fieldnotes from participation at the P/CVE workshops; this was done vis-à-vis reflections of the conversations and events at these workshops. To overcome this challenge, the researcher relied on trust and confidence building with the participants. For this, the researcher had to rely on snowball sampling technique to navigate the access challenge. Thus, the researcher got referrals and recommendations to other participants from the initial participants interviewed.

The article also utilised secondary data from academic and policy literature. The academic literature engaged includes literature on counterterrorism, preventing and countering violent extremism, state-civil society relations in counterterrorism, and intelligence. Policy literature used includes the United Nations Office of Terrorism, United Nations. Security Council and reports of Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). The research received ethics approval from the University of Kent's ethics review committee and a research permit from Nigeria's Defence Headquarters.

A whole society approach in P/CVE

The Obama administration introduced the Prevention of Corruption and Violence Against Extremism (P/CVE) approach in 2015 to combat terrorism and violent extremism. This "soft approach" focused on involving civil society and engaging them in the process has become a global "go-to" for national governments. The "whole-of-society" approach emphasises civil society's active involvement at all stages of the P/CVE process. Scholars like David Ucko, Kundnani, and Hayes emphasise the importance of involving CSOs in P/CVE processes due to their perceived legitimacy in addressing the triggers of violent extremism and their expertise in engaging with actors. It is crucial to ensure that P/CVE programmes and the whole of society approach are not non-exclusionary (Rosand et al. 2018). This approach is replicated in various P/CVE National Action Plans and strategies globally. Understanding how it is mobilised within the Nigerian context is crucial.

Interview narratives with state and non-state P/CVE actors are replete with stances that point to the significance of introducing P/CVE into the broader framework of Nigerian counterterrorism discourse and practice. For instance, a view given by a participant highlighted that the infusion of the approach within Nigeria's P/CVE discourse could be seen as an attempt to compensate for the not-too-pleasant circumstances that occasioned the implementation of the hard-power counterterrorism measures wherein there was a violation of human rights, and subsequent vicissitudes in state-society relations that were described as convivial by scholars (Njoku 2020b). In the words of a participant, the hard approach had not yielded results and then there was the need for the soft approach.

> the hard approach had not yielded result and then there was the need for the soft approach. The hard approach did not yield results as it were and we were having more problems being generated at almost every turn of events as government was initiating new policies. With regard to the hard approach, the issue of human rights killings seem to aggravate the problem, so the cry and the desire for the soft approach became so pronounced (Interview with senior policy officer ONSA-October 2022).

Reiterating the above view, another participant further asserted that,

> . . . a department for behavioural analysis and strategic communications was set up in the Office of the National Security Adviser. Now after setting up this department, a program was set up called the Countering violent extremism program. The department was where the whole ideas of CVE in Nigeria was first conceptualised. So, for context, as of the time the program was set up, because the history of Boko Haram was more ideological motivations. So, the bulk of their job then was to develop counter narrative, recruit and send well equipped Islamic clerics who looked like those guys and who had knowledge of Islam as well to say this is not what Islam is teaching. (Interview with Senior Staff Officer ONSA-October 2022)

The interview accounts provided above strengthen two interconnected elements of the discourse on fighting violent extremism. Firstly, it emphasises perspectives that emphasise how violations of human rights by government security forces and the resulting grievances can contribute to the emergence of violent extremism by creating favourable conditions for recruiting. Therefore, it highlights the extensive range of push and pull forces responsible for catalysing radicalisation to violent extremism which CVE was designed to address as outlined in the United Nations' 2016 Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (Fink 2014). Second, it underpins the importance of multidimensional P/CVE soft approach as the appropriate response mechanism to addressing both structural and practical issues (Fink 2014; Heydemann 2014), hence further reiterating the prioritisation of the whole-of-society and whole-of-government approaches. A senior officer at ONSA emphasised this:

> . . . I think that was the time that my shop under the leadership of my boss started working on the Presidential Initiative for the Northeast it was otherwise called PINE and it had people coming in from across the broad spectrum of government and MDA, from all key agencies that had something to do with regard to the soft approach of counter-terrorism. we had representatives from all over even from CSOs, what became from that body that General Danjuma then headed now ended with creation of NEDC. So, the paperwork for the establishment of NEDC started from our shop. So, PINE became PCNI, and it became NEDC. So, what is now known as whole of government and whole of society approach started with us. (Interview with senior officer in ONSA-November 2022).

The above further illustrates that, in addition to the seemingly counterproductive nature of the hard-approach measures to combating terrorism, another rationale underpinning the adoption of the soft approach of P/CVE was its inclination to allow non-governmental actors to influence and shape the strategies for countering violent extremism. This was intended to result in a more democratic and inclusive approach to security practices by the government. As a result, the whole-of-government strategy was adopted. The incorporation of P/CVE and the whole-of-society approach into the Nigerian counterterrorism repertoire and the broader national security policy represents a significant and necessary change in the conceptualisation of security. This transition represents a departure from a prior strategy that was influenced by a militaristic perspective and instead embraces a more democratic human security approach rooted in liberal values of inclusiveness, participation, and collaboration. The establishment of the Partnership Against Violent Extremism (PAVE) network by the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) in 2014 reinforces the significance of the whole-of-society approach in P/CVE, with inclusion being a fundamental pillar. The creation of the PAVE network not only highlights initiatives to encourage

comprehensive and collaborative approaches to security, but it also emphasises the importance of strong interaction between the government and communities as a key foundation. Therefore, we can acknowledge the acceptance of concepts of inclusive participation and the promotion of a culture of engagement.

Despite the fact that the PAVE network was created with the idea that the whole-of-society approach should be based on principles of inclusion, partnership, and involving CSOs, findings show that the approach and how it is used are inherently complicated. During interviews, a certain amount of ambiguity bottled up the concept and implementation of the whole-of-society approach. Specifically, the approach is characterised by duplicity regarding core components such as the composition of non-state actors, terms, and nature of engagement, as well as boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. Findings also reveal that one of the nodes of ambiguity in the approach is incongruity between state priorities and CSO expectations with regard to the composition of actors and the nature of engagement. Remarkably, some of the CSOs believed that the ambiguity surrounding selection criteria for the involvement and participation of CSOs explains contradictions that underpin the whole-of-society approach. Hence, ambiguity around the selection criteria plays a crucial role in ascertaining CSOs participation in the whole-of-society approach. As highlighted by a participant, one of such ambiguous indicators includes the metrics that state P/CVE policy actors adopt in ascertaining CSOs to partner with implementing whole-of-society approach. Giving credence to this position of strategic subjectivity underpinning the strategic engagement, a former senior staff officer in ONSA who was actively involved in the development of the NAPCVE highlighted how the inclusion and selection of CSOs was based on their seemingly cooperative relationship with state security agents. Explicitly, the participant stated that:

> We identified organisations that were into things to do with peace mediation, conflict resolution, women empowerment. So, identifying these people is important because when you identify these people, they are people doing good things already in the society, and it makes our whole-of-society easy (Interviews with former Staff Officer ONSA-December 2022 and January 2023).

This interview narrative highlights the intricate dynamics around the government's engagement of CSOs. Furthermore, the above quote also bears semblance with Thiessen's (2022) analysis of the ambiguity between arising from a mismatched expectation among external actors, national government and local population around PVE agenda in Kyrgyzstan. It points out that despite reference to engaging non-state actors in the implementation of P/CVE, the manner in which these engagements are effectuated are such that state actors deploy subjective, opaque, and unclear mechanisms of strategic delineation. For instance, drawing from the above interview quote, the phrase, "people doing good things", as used by the participant captures how the government delineates CSOs into subjective groups of "good" and "bad", which is hinged on these CSOs' willingness to conform and align with the government's motives and goals without giving them the opportunity to reinterpret and contest these practices even when they seem to contravene the norms and principles which formed the basis of the initial engagement. Specifically, the article argues here that the government's strategic delineation of CSOs into subjective classifications of "good" and "bad", based solely on alignment with

government's objectives, serves as a means of State-CSO strategic engagement and ultimately facilitates the exclusion of CSOs, and undermine CSOs actorness.

Further reiterating how the delineation of CSOs is perpetrated in the government's strategic engagement of CSOs in P/CVE activities, a senior officer of a security agency emphasised how interpersonal relations play a role in government's choice of engaging CSOs. The participant buttressed this view by underscoring how the proximity of directors of CSOs to either serving or former officials in security establishments plays a role in influencing government's strategic engagement. According to the participant:

> . . . they have a few Nigerian NGOs for reasons of rights, I will not mention, that they work with. Otherwise, they are very cold about inviting and accommodating NGOs at all. . .. because I know for well that the DHQ, the Ministry of Defence and the Office of the National security Adviser, without attribution, does engage constantly XYZ NGOs. The Nigerian Army Resource Centre also does a lot of work with very prominent NGOs (Interview with senior Officer at Military Intelligence- November 2022).

While the quote by the participant emphasises how the role of interpersonal relations and proximity of heads of CSOs to the top hierarchy of security agencies facilitates the delineation, exclusion, and engagement of CSOs under P/CVE's whole-of-society approach, It further highlights that despite acknowledging its limits in singlehandedly effectuating the P/CVE policy process and recognising the need for partnership with CSOs, the Nigerian government feels obliged to define the parameters of the partnership such that it opts to delineate and co-opts supposed "good" CSOs to serve its purposes.

Furthermore, responses from some civil society actors also highlight how the government's strategic exclusion mechanism enables the co-option of CSOs that adopt less critical views of the government's P/CVE programme. Some participants attributed the government's exclusion of them and their CSOs from engagement to their seemingly critical position in some of the government's P/CVE policies. For instance, the director of an Islamic civil society organisation noted how his organisation, which was initially actively engaged with the government on developing terrorist counternarratives, became excluded from subsequent engagements. He noted how he stopped receiving invitations to undertake counternarrative developments and participation in government-organised workshops and programmes on P/CVE. He attributed his exclusion to two factors. On the one hand, his critical perspective on some of the government's approaches in developing counternarratives used in deradicalising terrorists. On the other hand, he highlighted how the officials involved in the programme at the Office of the National Security Adviser had their choices of people they preferred to work with. In his words, 'they have those that they chose to work with, those that won't tell them something is wrong with the approaches adopted' (Interview with Director Islamic based CBO- Abuja February 2023).

The above findings resonate with extant arguments and theorisations in the scholarship on state-CSO relations in counterterrorism in various contexts. First, the study mirrors studies by Howell and Lind, where they highlighted that the state-CSO relations in counterterrorism implementation in Afghanistan, India, and Kenya were premised on the construction of CSOs as "good" and "bad" and the subsequent deployment of the logic of co-option and control (Howell and Lind 2009). While the CSOs constructed as "good" are considered decent and thus engaged by these governments to perform service delivery roles, those constructed as "bad" are regarded as decadent and are either

stifled or excluded from engagement. Second, the study also ties into arguments raised by Fowler and Sen regarding how states strategically utilise aid tactically to categorise, engage, co-opt and control CSOs. They highlight that CSOs are categorised into "donor darlings" and "donor orphans" (Fowler and Sen 2010). The State engages and partners with the former while the latter is neglected and marginalised. Third, it builds on recent studies on the strategic exclusion of CSOs by the Nigerian State in the design and implementation of CTMs (Njoku 2021b). Furthermore, the findings highlight the theoretical foundations of the SECC framework about the contextual differences in the actions of individuals involved in state-society relationships. Pierobon (2022) argues that civil society organisations (CSOs) in Kyrgyzstan, a Central Asian country, were successful in appropriating, contesting, and reinterpreting the norms related to PVE that were spread by the European Union (EU). However, as findings indicate, in Nigeria, CSOs ability to context unequal power dynamics and relations are greatly eroded and influenced by the influence of the state to create difficult operational environment for their activities (Njoku 2022a).

Furthermore, the findings advance debates on how the increasing rise of pro-government-funded CSOs in Nigeria contributes to democratic backsliding (Page 2021). The study thus argues that ambiguities around how state-society engagement in P/CVE is to be done function as a mechanism through which strategic exclusion is perpetuated in Nigeria's P/CVE. Additionally, the findings reiterate views in the critical terrorism studies, which highlight the influence of the violence prevention framework and its logic of pre-emptively mobilising government-community partnership in P/CVE measures as the panacea to preventing terrorism while at the same time empowering government and its agents to infiltrate these partnerships and to function as the leading players in this engagement and partnership (Alimahomed-Wilson and Zahzah 2023).

Iron fist in velvet glove? whole of society approach as strategic engagement for producing intelligence for the state

Having already established that engagements between state and civil society are one of the bedrocks that underpin the whole of society approach in P/CVE, it is crucial to understand how the strategic engagements facilitated under this approach functioned in other latent ways such as benign forms of intelligence gathering and the normalisation of surveillance activities on CSOs. Hence, this second aspect of the findings unpacks how strategic engagements that the Nigerian state facilitates with select CSOs within the purview of the whole of society approach in P/CVE become avenues through which the state furnishes its intelligence arsenal about local communities. These strategic engagements are weaponised to legitimate intelligence gathering and state surveillance. The normalisation of surveillance practices is enabled by the development of strategic engagements such as the whole of society approach, which involve the creation of diverse partnerships and engagements between government and CSOs. These partnerships are often based on liberal notions of inclusivity, which emphasise the importance of involving a broad range of stakeholders in decision-making processes. Through these engagements, the seemingly innocuous practices of surveillance and soft intelligence are perpetuated, often without scrutiny or critique.

First, an analysis of the NAPCVE policy document demonstrates how the Nigerian government prioritises intelligence gathering as a crucial piece of its P/CVE

approach. The NAPCVE discloses that the "PCVE programming must be intelligence-led (NAPCVE, 2017). As such, making a 'whole-of-society approach' in P/CVE and the social interaction its generates an addition to the repertoire of state intelligence practice. While intelligence gathering has always been a banal practice of states (Hoffmann, Chalati, and Dogan 2023), its extension and infusion into state-society relations and security governance networks under the guise of fostering interaction and collaboration renders such engagements questionable. However, it is easy to understand the importance the Nigerian state attaches to intelligence practice in its P/CVE programming, considering the state's threatening disposition towards non-state actors in the context of counterterrorism measures (Njoku 2020a). This is further reified by the position of intelligence studies scholars on the prevailing existential belief of suspicion that intelligence agencies have towards everyone and their hesitance to share information (Hoffmann, Chalati, and Dogan 2023). They highlight how these agencies of the state a priori operate under the logic of suspicion and secrecy. By their very nature and organisational culture, state security actors and intelligence agencies operate secretively and insulated, avoiding direct and explicit interactions with citizens and civil society. This background of reluctance to engage in interactions thus casts aspersion on the engagements among state security actors, a chunk of whom are intelligence agencies, vis-à-vis the underlying logic of the whole-of-society approach to P/CVE.

The discursive accounts from state actors further reveal that the purpose of States' engagements with CSOs and community organisations on issues relating to countering violent extremism, terrorist rehabilitation and deradicalisation, is majorly to generate more intelligence that the state uses in its anti-terrorism measures. A senior officer in the ONSA explained the difficulty in dissociating intelligence gathering from P/CVE, and most especially the whole of society approach. He noted: "Information gathering, and intelligence gathering are the most important responsibilities of the whole of society approach" (Interview with Director at ONSA, November 2022). The participant's response highlights some pertinent issues. First, it points to the weaponisation of the various spaces of engagement between the Nigerian state and CSOs that emerge from the whole of society approach for the expansion of intelligence gathering practices and surveillance tactics. These practices are made legitimate under the guise of narratives that emphasise the limits of a sole government action, as well as the importance of everybody's participation and involvement in countering violent extremism. Second, the response highlights an attempt at instrumentalising and placing responsibility of security on CSOs, while also depoliticising violence. As such, engagements that emanate from the whole of society approach are existing in order to support state's intelligence practice by legitimising all forms of responses that the state adopts to countering violent extremism. Hence, by integrating intelligence and surveillance practices into state-society engagements, there is the foreclosing of any attempt to challenge the Nigerian state and its uncoordinated governance of P/CVE. Further buttressing this perspective, another P/CVE practitioner who is a non-state actor highlights how state security actors and intelligence organisations dominate state-society engagement platforms such as committee meetings and workshops.

> Sometimes before a meeting. They (ONSA) are given clear warnings. . .. They are already telling them that in the capacity building meetings don't talk don't give out information on the CVE we were jointly meant to talk about (Interview with P/CVE non-state actor and member of PAVE network-December 2022)' . . . .and of course, it includes quite a lot of state actor representatives and a sprinkling of non-state actor representatives. But even at that, you find at meetings, the only people who can actually really talk are the sprinkling of non-state actors (Interview with P/CVE non-state actor-December 2022).

While noting the contradictory misalignment between P/CVE's rhetoric of inclusivity and the actual practices on the ground, he explained as follows:

> OK, so the committee has been, the steering committee is now in place. And of course, it includes quite a lot of state actor representatives and a sprinkling of non-state actor representatives. - This is a steering committee that is supposed to advise, isn't it? That is supposed to give strategic oversight to all of these things. People are looking at the coordinator of the Counter terrorism centre, which chairs the meetings or the head of P/CVE before they talk. And often what it means, and because those ones will talk first, it means that they are careful what to say (Interview with P/CVE non-state actor-December 2022).

While the above narrative raises an important point on the imbalance in the composition of engagement platforms that epitomise the whole-of-society arrangement, wherein state actors constitute the majority of participants, it also highlights how state actors, especially security actors, engage in acts of self-silencing and censoring during P/CVE engagements and meetings. This act constitutes what scholars in the field of intelligence studies describe as the social life and everyday practice of intelligence that is carried out by intelligence actors (Jaffel and Larsson 2021). Further demonstrating the dominance of the state actors in engagement platforms, another participant highlights the presence of very few CSOs in most meetings due to restriction and vetting by the state. Similarly, I observed this trend during my participation at three different workshops on P/CVE and terrorist deradicalisation, wherein the same set of CSOs actors were present at all these workshops. The routing of intelligence gathering through these engagements is further captured by another participant who points outs how the interactions that take place under the guise of community engagement by the government are always covert means of either deploying its surveillance obligations or gathering intelligence from non-state civil actors and communities (Author's fieldnotes-October 2022 and February 2023). A P/CVE practitioner puts it thus:

> So even when you say you are engaging with communities, you are engaging with civil society, your engagement is actually informing communities, informing civil society on the one hand, and then trying to get intelligence from communities and from civil society on the other hand (Interview with P/CVE non-state actor and member of PAVE network-December 2022).

> So, there is the security community as a whole that tends to instinctively, and also from practice, exclude non-security actors. so even when they say we are engaging with communities, we are engaging with civil society, your engagement is actually informing communities, informing civil society on the one hand, and then trying to get intelligence from communities and from civil societies on the other hand. So, it's really not an engagement about co-creating ideas, co-creating solutions and co-implementing those solutions. (Interview with P/CVE non-state actor and member of PAVE Network-December 2022).

The above quotes highlight the extent of the entrenchment of subliminal intelligence-gathering practices into state-society P/CVE meetings and engagements. These practices are predominantly perpetuated and replicated across the various nodes of the P/CVE steering committee. This slippery slope rationalisation of surveillance and intelligence-gathering practices into P/CVE is particularly problematic for several factors. First, enthroning surveillance and monitoring practices through P/CVE in the name of national security, wherein non-state actors are seen through the gaze of embodying risks, creates a situation where these non-state civil actors engage the Nigerian government on a suspicious basis/perspective. This is particularly detrimental for a context like Nigeria, where existing state-society community policing relations function under mutual suspicion and a lack of trust (Akintayo 2019). This consequently stunts the growth and undermines the development of P/CVE in Nigeria, especially concerning the emergence of a state-level P/CVE action plan and review of the current version of the outdated NAPCVE. Second, integrating soft surveillance and intelligence practices into these engagement spaces further enlarges the already existing wide state-society gap in Nigeria. Intuitively, this reduction of P/CVE engagement activities to intelligence-gathering practices impinges on the extent to which non-state actors access and are to be trusted with security-related information and knowledge. Broadly, these findings buttress accounts of how the pre-emptive logic underpinning P/CVE bolstered the role of intelligence practices to the point where acts of intelligence gathering have consequently become established as the predominant means through which pre-emptive counterterrorism is carried out. Reinforcing this point, a respondent explained that:

> For them it's even more of a protected turf and everybody who is not cleared security wise is a threat you understand that we can give out information can be these can be that. . .. And so, you usually find a discrepancy between intention, which is policy and legislation, and practice on the ground. So, on the ground, practitioners still see this as a state security problem. And the instinct that comes with that is to exclude all non-security actors. (Interview with P/CVE non-state actor and member of PAVE Network-December 2022).

My observations at the various P/CVE workshops also highlighted the sense that state security actors make of P/CVE in Nigeria. Interestingly, despite acknowledging the importance of incorporating CSOs into different engagement activities, government P/CVE practitioners and security actors collectively positioned with the view that P/CVE is based upon the logic of state security and should continually perpetuate features such as surveillance and intelligence gathering practices. An unpacking of P/CVE in Nigeria has revealed that while there are government-level attempts to enable collaboration and engagements with non-state actors, these engagements mainly take the form of pseudo-institutionalised networks that facilitate the folding of CSOs into intelligence-gathering activities. By utilising languages that give credence to the participation and involvement of CSOs in security governance, Nigeria's P/CVE programme is typified as soft surveillance and intelligence gathering measures. These strategic engagements with CSOs perform the function of a domestic surveillance programme, further expanding the gap between state and society. In other words, there is a mismatch in the theory and practice of the whole-of-society approach in Nigeria's P/CVE, as the approach remains steeped in traditional state-security top-down framework in which the state, its security and intelligence agencies are by default considered the security providers.

In contrast, civil society organisations and other non-state civil actors are perceived as instruments/objects that are co-opted, controlled, and contained through varying strategic mechanisms. The preceding narrative buttresses two interrelated P/CVE and intelligence studies scholarship standpoints. On the one hand, it validates Kundnani's argument that the P/CVE agenda has widened intelligence-gathering in dangerous and sinister ways by linking community and local authority bodies with the police in information and intelligence exchange on individuals in the community (Kundnani 2015). On the other hand, the introduction of intelligence practices into state-CSO engagements/relations underpins the arguments by scholars in intelligence studies on the expansion of intelligence beyond its traditional spheres of activity into a transversal practice, as well as its effects on the reconstitution and reconfiguration of actors (Jaffel and Larsson 2021). Additionally, the arguments advanced in this article contribute to ongoing scholarly debates on the contestation between security politics and civil society (Petersen and Rønn 2019). Hence, it argues that the P/CVE agenda in Nigeria through the whole-of-society approach has widened intelligence-gathering in more benign and less-noticeable ways of strategic engagements that co-opt and control CSOs.

Conclusion

This article aimed to expand the understanding of the SECC framework by elucidating the nuanced dynamics inherent in the interplay between the state and civil society organisations (CSOs) in the context of P/CVE. It addressed two questions: To what extent do governmental policies concerning P/CVE truly reflect a commitment to inclusivity, grounded in principles of pluralism, neutrality, and independence? Does the relationship truly reflect a whole-of-society approach, or does it merely utilise CSOs as tools for generating intelligence? This article argues that the current practice of the whole-of-society approach within the context of P/CVE in Nigeria tends to tactically select some CSOs while excluding others, instrumentalise them as intelligence producers, and delegate surveillance, thus contradicting the very logic of the approach. The strategic engagement platforms and interactions elicited through this approach have vastly been reduced to benign forms of intelligence practice, which are justified by discourses that give credence to the participation and involvement of CSOs in security governance. This finding is significant in two ways:

First, the study advances the SECC framework by facilitating a nuanced understanding of the multifaceted dimensions characterising state-CSO interactions in the context of P/CVE in Nigeria. By x-raying the empirical case, this article has expanded the theoretical applicability of the SECC framework in theorising the state's behaviour towards CSOs in conflict, violence, and security. Thus, the article opens strings of interrogations and directions of action that can be further explored through empirical studies advancing the interactions of various concepts within the SECC framework. In this endeavour, the SECC framework is of utmost importance, as it offers a balanced critique of the actions of states and CSOs within the web of state-society relations in P/CVE. Furthermore, the article introduces the potential for future studies that will analyse and compare the relationships between the state and various components of society within the policy framework of P/CVE across African countries.

Second, this study makes a practical contribution to the field by offering nuanced insights into the complexities and contradictions of state-CSO relations. By adopting a critical perspective that scrutinises both state and CSO practices, the study aims to reveal the structural inequalities and power dynamics that often underpin seemingly collaborative efforts. Ultimately, by unpacking the intricacies of state-CSO interactions in the context of P/CVE, this inquiry seeks to inform policy discourse and contribute to the development of more equitable and effective strategies for countering violent extremism. The article thus underscores the need to build a shared culture and understanding of security. By providing a much-needed critical analysis of Nigeria's soft approach to counterterrorism, the article adds to the existing few studies that have critically analysed counter-terrorism measures and their effects on societal inclusion (Chukwuma 2022, Oyawale 2020; Ejiofor 2022; Njoku 2021b). Further, by incorporating primary data from key stakeholders, the article addresses the problematique in the literature on counterterrorism in Nigeria and its heavy reliance on secondary data (Chukwuma 2022; Njoku 2021a).

Notes

1. The concept of the "whole-of-society" approach originated in the public health sector, but it has also been adopted in the Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) domain to reflect a comprehensive, cooperative endeavour between governmental and non-governmental entities. This approach emphasises the need for diverse stakeholders to work together towards a common goal, leveraging their unique strengths and resources to effectively prevent the spread of violent extremism. It is hinged on principles of partnership, and cooperation between state and non-state actor.
2. While CVE is seen as closely tied to a security-focused counter-terrorism framework that expands the focus of security to social policy areas, PVE refers to proactive prevention approach that goes beyond security-driven framework and encompasses development-oriented areas (Stephens, Sieckelinck, and Boutellier 2021). Nonetheless, scholars use both interchangeably to refer to noncoercive interventions that pre-emptively address violence.
3. Nigeria's National Counterterrorism Strategy (NACTEST) was launched as the country's first policy document designed to combat the challenge of terrorism in 2014. NACTEST was initiated and organised around five work strands: Forestall, to prevent people from becoming terrorists; Secure, to strengthen protection; Identify, to pre-empt attacks; Prepare, to build resilience; and implementation, to mobilise efforts. A revised version was published in 2016.
4. Nigeria's National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (NAPCVE) was launched on August 2017, with an overarching goal of "partnership for safer and resilient communities".
5. The "Borno model" for integrated management of mass exits, commonly referred to as the "Borno model", is a state-led programme for managing those that have exited the insurgency. The model comprises five phases- reception to release, or further treatment – investigation and potential prosecution of individuals based on case management in centres.

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of the article was presented at 'The changing modes and frames of contemporary counter-terrorism: policies, practices, and institutions of prevention' Panel of the 10th European

Workshops in International Studies (EWIS) 2023. The author wishes to thank panelists and discussants for their comments. Numerous thoughtful conversations with my PhD supervisors, Yvan Guichoua and Harmonie Toros, sparked the creativity that birthed this article. Emeka Thaddues Njoku and Promise Frank Ejiofor were very helpful with their insightful comments, which contributed significantly to the quality of this paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding

This work was supported by Académie Internationale de Lutte Contre le Terrorisme (AILCT) Doctoral Fellowship Programme.

Notes on contributor

Joshua Akintayo is a PhD student at the Department of Politics and International Relations, the University of Kent, United Kingdom. Joshua's PhD research critically examines the complex nature of government engagement with Muslim communities and non-state actors in the context of the Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) and deradicalisation programme in north-eastern Nigeria. His works have appeared in Conflict, Security and Development, South African Journal of International Affairs and the African Journal of Terrorism.

ORCID

Joshua Akintayo http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4251-597X

References

Abbas, T. 2012. "The Symbiotic Relationship Between Islamophobia and Radicalisation." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 5 (3): 345–358. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2012.723448.

Abbas, T., and I. Awan. 2015. "Limits of UK Counterterrorism Policy and Its Implications for Islamophobia and Far Right Extremism." *International Journal for Crime, Justice & Social Democracy* 4 (3): 16–29. https://doi.org/10.5204/ijcjsd.v4i3.241.

Abdel-Fattah, R. 2020. "Countering Violent Extremism, Governmentality and Australian Muslim Youth As 'Becoming Terrorist." *Journal of Sociology* 56 (3): 372–387. https://doi.org/10.1177/1440783319842666.

Agastia, I. G. B. D., A. A. B. Perwita, and D. B. Subedi. 2020. "Countering Violent Extremism Through State-Society Partnerships: A Case Study of de-Radicalisation Programmes in Indonesia." *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 15 (1): 23–43. https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2020.1722317.

Akintayo, J. 2019. "Community policing approach: Joint task force and community relations in the context of countering violent extremism in Nigeria. on Terrorism, 137.

Alimahomed-Wilson, S., and Y. Zahzah. 2023. "Women and Warcare: Gendered Islamophobia in Counterterrorism." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 16 (1): 240–262. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2023.2173126.

Atta, F. K. 2023. "Understanding Africa's Terrorism Debacle: A Critical Analysis of Counterterrorism in Burkina Faso." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 16 (1): 23–41. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2022.2121365.

Author's fieldnotes at P/CVE workshops. Abuja October 2022 and February 2023.
Author's interviews with a director at the Office of the National Security Adviser, ONSA. 2022. October and November Abuja.
Author's interviews with a former senior officer at the Office of the National Security Adviser ONSA, Abuja. December 2022 and January 2023.
Author's interview with a former policy officer at the Office of the National Security Adviser ONSA. 2022. Abuja. December.
Author's interview with a senior officer at the Military Intelligence. 2022. November Abuja.
Author's Interview with Executive Director of Islamic CSO on CVE and peacebuilding. 2023. February Abuja.
Author's interview with national P/CVE Practitioner. 2022. November Abuja.
Author's interview with the director of a P/CVE focused CSO and member of the PAVE network. 2022. December Abuja.
Author's interview with the program manager of a faith-based CSO focused on Peacebuilding and advocacy. 2023. February Abuja.
Badurdeen, F. A. 2023. "Local contours and global discourses in countering violent radicalisation and extremism: A perspective from the global south." In *The Routledge Handbook on Radicalisation and Countering Radicalisation*, edited by J. Busher, L. Malkki, and S. Marsden, 528–540. London: Routledge.
Breen-Smyth, M. 2014. "Theorising the 'Suspect community: Counterterrorism, Security Practices and the Public Imagination." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 7 (2): 223–240. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2013.867714.
Breidlid, T. 2021. "Countering or Contributing to Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in Kenya? A Critical Case Study." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 14 (2): 225–246. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2021.1902613.
Chukwuma, K. H. 2022. "Critical Terrorism Studies and Postcolonialism: Constructing Ungoverned Spaces in Counter-Terrorism Discourse in Nigeria." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 15 (2): 399–416. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2022.2048990.
Clark, J. 1995. "The State, Popular Participation, and the Voluntary Sector." *World Development* 23 (4): 593–601. https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(94)00147-Q.
Cuccu, F. L. 2023. "Prevention politics in non-Western contexts: Training imams in post-revolutionary Tunisia." In *Vulnerability*, 183–200. Manchester University Press.
Dan Suleiman, M. 2023. "The Jihadists Are Coming! Abyssal Thinking and Spatial Politics of Un/Knowing in Ghana's Terrorism Discourse." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 16 (4): 620–647. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2023.2250142.
Daucé, F. 2015. "'The Duality of Coercion in Russia: Cracking Down on 'foreign agents." *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 23 (1): 57–75.
De Coning, C. 2018. "Adaptive Peacebuilding." *International Affairs* 94 (2): 301–317. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix251.
Edwards, M., and D. Hulme. 1992. "Making a Difference: NGOs and Development in a Changing World." *Earthscan*.
Ejiofor, P. F. 2022. "'Fulanis Are Foreign terrorists': The Social Construction of a Suspect Community in the Sahel." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 15 (2): 333–355. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2021.2015841.
Fink, N. C. 2014. "Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism." *Policy Brief*, November.
Fowler, A. 1992. *NGOs As Agents of Democratization: An African Perspective, Mimeo*. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.
Fowler, A., and K. Sen. 2010. "Embedding the War on Terror: State and Civil Society Relations." *Development and Change* 41 (1): 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2009.01620.x.
Gielen, A. J. 2017. *Evaluating countering violent extremism*, 101–118. Deradicalisation: Scientific insights for policy.
Harris-Hogan, S., K. Barrelle, and A. Zammit. 2016. "What Is Countering Violent Extremism? Exploring CVE Policy and Practice in Australia." *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 8 (1): 6–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2015.1104710.

Heath-Kelly, C. 2013. "Counter-Terrorism and the Counterfactual: Producing the 'Radicalisation'discourse and the UK PREVENT Strategy." *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 15 (3): 394–415. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2011.00489.x.

Heydemann, S. 2014. "Countering Violent Extremism As a Field of Practice." *United States Institute of Peace Insights* 1 (1): 9–11.

Hoffmann, S., N. Chalati, and A. Dogan. 2023. "Rethinking Intelligence Practices and Processes: Three Sociological Concepts for the Study of Intelligence." *Intelligence and National Security* 38 (3): 319–338. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2022.2113679.

Howell, J. 2014. "The Securitisation of NGOs Post-9/11." *Conflict, Security & Development* 14 (2): 151–179. https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2014.903692.

Howell, J., and J. Lind. 2009. *Civil Society Under Strain: Counter-Terrorism Policy, Civil Society and Aid Post-9/11*. Kumarian Press.

Howell, J., and J. Lind. 2010. "Securing the World and Challenging Civil Society: Before and After the 'War on terror'." *Development and Change* 41 (2): 279–291. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2010.01635.x.

Hummel, P. 2015. "Strategic Ambiguity About Military Capacity with Multiple Adversaries." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 27 (2): 288–300. https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629814531517.

Jaffel, H. B., and S. Larsson, eds. 2021. *Problematising Intelligence Studies: Towards a New Research Agenda*. London: Routledge.

Jarvis, L., and M. Lister. 2010. "Stakeholder Security: The New Western Way of Counter-Terrorism?." *Contemporary Politics* 16 (2): 173–188. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569771003783943.

Kaleem, A. 2022. "Citizen-Led Intelligence Gathering under UK's Prevent Duty." In *Problematising Intelligence Studies*, 73–95. Routledge.

Krasnopolskaya, I., Y. Skokova, and U. Pape. 2015. "Government–Nonprofit Relations in Russia's Regions: An Exploratory Analysis." *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 26 (6): 2238–2266. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-015-9654-3.

Kundnani, A. 2009. "Spooked! How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism."

Kundnani, A. 2015. *The Muslims Are Coming: Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror*. Verso Books.

Kundnani, A., and B. Hayes. 2018. *'The Globalisation of Countering Violent Extremism policies'. Undermining Human Rights, Instrumentalising Civil Society*. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute.

Letsch, L. 2023. "Preventing/Countering Violent and Hateful Extremism in Morocco and Tunisia–Understanding the Role of Civil Society and International Assistance." *Conflict, Security & Development* 23 (5): 483–500. https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2023.2216151.

Mesok, E. 2022. "Counterinsurgency, Community Participation, and the Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Agenda in Kenya." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 33 (4–5): 720–741. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2022.2037908.

Monaghan, J. 2014. "Security Traps and Discourses of Radicalization: Examining Surveillance Practices Targeting Muslims in Canada." *Surveillance & Society* 12 (4): 485–501. https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v12i4.4557.

The National Counter-Terrorism Strategy. (NACTEST). 2014. Office of the National Security Adviser. (NACTEST.

Nguyen, N. 2019. *Suspect Communities: Anti-Muslim Racism and the Domestic War on Terror*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Nigeria National Action Plan for Preventing And Countering Violent Extremism (NAPCVE). 2017. Office of the National Security Adviser.

Njoku, E. T. 2020a. "Investigating the Intersections Between Counter-Terrorism and NGOs in Nigeria: Development Practice in Conflict-Affected Areas." *Development in Practice* 30 (4): 501–512. https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2020.1714546.

Njoku, E. T. 2020b. "Politics of Conviviality? State–Civil Society Relations within the Context of Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria." *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations* 31 (5): 1063–1076. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-017-9910-9.

Njoku, E. T. 2021a. "The State of Terrorism Research in Africa." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 14 (4): 502–505. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2021.1983113.

Njoku, E. T. 2021a. "Strategic Exclusion: The State and the Framing of a Service Delivery Role for Civil Society Organizations in the Context of Counterterrorism in Nigeria." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 44 (5): 410–430. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1543131.

Njoku, E. T. 2021b. "Strategic Exclusion: The State and the Framing of a Service Delivery Role for Civil Society Organizations in the Context of Counterterrorism in Nigeria." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 44 (5): 410–430. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1543131.

Njoku, E. T. 2022a. "The State and the Securitization of Civil Society Organizations in Nigeria." *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 51 (1): 190–215. https://doi.org/10.1177/08997640211003256.

Njoku, E. T. 2022b. "Strategic Exclusion, Co-Option and Containment: Towards an Integrative Theory of State-CSOs Relations." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 15 (4): 917–944. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2022.2111776.

Njoku, E. T. 2022b. "Strategic Exclusion, Co-Option and Containment: Towards an Integrative Theory of State-CSOs Relations." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 15 (4): 917–944. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2022.2111776 .

Oando, S., and S. Achieng'. 2021. "An Indigenous African Framework for Counterterrorism: Decolonising Kenya's Approach to Countering "Al-Shabaab-Ism." *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 14 (3): 354–377. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2021.1958182.

O'Toole, T., N. Meer, D. N. DeHanas, S. H. Jones, and T. Modood. 2016. "Governing Through Prevent? Regulation and Contested Practice in State–Muslim Engagement." *Sociology* 50 (1): 160–177. https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038514564437.

Oyawale, A. 2020. "The Mayor of Abuja and the 'Pied Piper'of Maiduguri: Extremism and the 'politics of mutual envy'in Nigeria?" In *Encountering extremism*, 287–308. Manchester University Press.

Oyawale, A. 2023. "'Ontological'(in) security under post-colonial conditions: Countering violent extremism in Nigeria." In *Vulnerability*, edited by C. Heath-Kelly and B. Gruber, 201–219. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Page, M. T. 2021. "Fake Civil Society: The Rise of Pro-Government NGOs in Nigeria. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website. https://carnegieendowment.

Pantazis, C., and S. Pemberton. 2009. "From the 'Old'to the 'New'suspect Community: Examining the Impacts of Recent UK Counter-Terrorist Legislation." *The British Journal of Criminology* 49 (5): 646–666. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azp031.

Patel, F., and M. Koushik. 2017. *Countering Violent Extremism*, 1–80. New York, NY: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law.

Petersen, K. L., and K. V. Rønn. 2019. "Introducing the Special Issue: Bringing in the Public. Intelligence on the Frontier Between State and Civil Society." *Intelligence and National Security* 34 (3): 311–316. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2019.1553365.

Pierobon, C. 2022. "European Union, Civil Society and Local Ownership in Kyrgyzstan: Analysing Patterns of Adaptation, Reinterpretation and Contestation in the Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE)." *Central Asian Survey* 41 (4): 752–769. https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2021.1905608.

Rosand, E., E. Winterbotham, M. Jones, and F. Praxl-Tabuchi. 2018. *A Roadmap to Progress: The State of the Global P/CVE Agenda*. London, United Kingdom: The Prevention Project and Royal United Services Institute.

Shanaah, S. 2022. "Alienation or Cooperation? British Muslims' Attitudes to and Engagement in Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Extremism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 34 (1): 71–92. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2019.1663829.

Sian, K. P. 2015. "Spies, Surveillance and Stakeouts: Monitoring Muslim Moves in British State Schools." *Race Ethnicity and Education* 18 (2): 183–201. https://doi.org/10.1080/13613324.2013.830099.

Simoncini, G. 2020. "International PVE and Tunisia: A local critique of international donors' discourses." In *Encountering extremism*, edited by A. Martini, K. Ford and R. Richard, 180–199. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.

Spalek, B., and A. Imtoual. 2007. "Muslim Communities and Counter-Terror responses: "Hard" Approaches to Community Engagement in the UK and Australia." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 27 (2): 185–202. https://doi.org/10.1080/13602000701536117.

Stanley, T., S., Guru, and V. Coppock. 2020. "A risky time for Muslim families: Professionalised counter-radicalisation networks." In *Risk in Social Work Practice*, edited by A. Whittaker and B. Taylor, 105–118. London, UK: Routledge.

Stephens, W., S., Sieckelinck, and H. Boutellier. 2021. "Preventing Violent Extremism: A Review of the Literature." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 44 (4): 346–361.

Sumpter, C. 2017. "Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Priorities, Practice and the Role of Civil Society." *Journal for Deradicalization* 11:112–147.

Taylor, J. D. 2020. "'Suspect Categories,'alienation and Counterterrorism: Critically Assessing PREVENT in the UK." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 32 (4): 851–873. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2017.1415889.

Thiessen, C. 2022. "The Strategic Ambiguity of the United Nations Approach to Preventing Violent Extremism." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 45 (2): 111–132. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1647685.

Thomas, P. 2016. "Youth, Terrorism and Education: Britain's Prevent Programme." *International Journal of Lifelong Education* 35 (2): 171–187. https://doi.org/10.1080/02601370.2016.1164469.

Ucko, D. H. 2018. "Preventing Violent Extremism Through the United Nations: The Rise and Fall of a Good Idea." *International Affairs* 94 (2): 251–270. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix235.

Valverde, M. 2011. "Questions of Security: A Framework for Research." *Theoretical Criminology* 15 (1): 3–22. https://doi.org/10.1177/1362480610382569.

Van Ginkel, B. 2017. "Countering and preventing the threat of terrorism and violent extremism: From the international and European to the national and local levels. Resilient Cities, Countering Violent Extremism at Local Level." In *cooperation with CIDOB (Barcelona Center for International Affairs)*, 29–35. University of St. Andrews and Europe for Citizens. Barcelona.

Wilkinson, R., ed. 2005. *The Global Governance Reader*. London: Psychology Press.