Art-ificial: The Philosophy of AI Art

This thesis aims to contribute to a novel area of philosophical work: the philosophy of AI art. AI art is proliferating online and increasingly in the world of art. The growing presence of works made by (or with) artificial intelligence has led to a clamour of questions such as 'Is AI art really art?' and 'can AI be truly creative?'. As yet, these questions have barely been tackled in the philosophical literature, especially in aesthetics. This thesis aims to address this gap.

This thesis starts by establishing what we mean by 'AI art' by examining examples of AI works and the technological underpinnings of these systems. Existing work on the topic of AI art is explicated. In particular, Mark Coeckelbergh's three questions on AI art scaffold the first three chapters of the thesis: 'can machines create art?', 'can machines create art?' and 'can machines create art?'

Chapter 1 aims to answer the question of whether AI can make art through the evaluation of AI works against three definitions of art: the institutional account, the historical account, and the cluster account. Chapter 2 focusses on the question of whether AI can be creative. Three accounts of creativity are utilised: a Darwinian theory of creativity, Margaret Boden's account of creativity, and Berys Gaut's agential account of creativity. It is argued that some AI systems can meet the requirements of each of these, aside from Gaut's necessary criterion of agency. After chapters 1 and 2, questions about the limitations of AI systems in meeting the requirements of different accounts of art and creativity remain; chapter 3 aims to address some of these. The possibility of AI (extended) mind is investigated, followed by AI embodiment. Finally, an argument for the possibility of AI agency is put forward. This minimal account of agency allows for the possibility of AI creativity under the agential account.

The latter part of this thesis begins with chapter 4, which examines the possibility that AI systems will not share aesthetic or artistic values with humans, and whether this is cause for concern. Finally, Chapter 5 examines two qualities of AI images: weirdness and convincingness, showing that AI art can offer interesting aesthetic qualities worthy of investigation. Through this thesis, I put forward a first step in developing a philosophy of AI art.