Reply to Dahl (2023): moral content is varied, and premature definitions should not constrain it

To propose a clear psychological definition of morality is no easy task, and Dahl (2023) is to be commended here for not only doing so, but

leaving an explicit paper trail of traits deemed desirable for any such proposal. However, while a rationale for calling phenomena “moral” would be useful, is it really as vital for the conduct of research as Dahl presumes? We instead argue that the definition of the term “morality” is not always a task of scientific definition similar to defining “cell” or “attitude”, but rather can be seen as a meta-scientific task for organising research. When morality

itself is a construct that figures in theories and hypotheses, this construct usually depends on lay views of whether the moral realm is involved. This insight, in our view, argues for a broader rather than narrower approach to defining morality, which we explain in the final section.