Gallagher, Maria, Torok, Agoston, Klaas, Johanna, Ferrè, Elisa Raffaella (2020) Gravity prior in human behaviour: a perceptual or semantic phenomenon? Experimental Brain Research, 238 . pp. 1957-1962. ISSN 0014-4819. E-ISSN 1432-1106. (doi:10.1007/s00221-020-05852-5) (KAR id:98120)
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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00221-020-05852-5 |
Abstract
Humans show a gravitational advantage in perception: we are more precise at judging the speed of downwards-moving than upwards-moving objects, indicating that gravitational acceleration is an internalised prior. However, it is unclear whether this gravity prior is based on purely perceptual cues or whether it can incorporate semantic knowledge. Previous research has used only objects which are known to comply with gravity, possibly confounding semantic and perceptual cues. Here we have addressed this question by asking participants to judge the speed of objects that typically move coherently with gravity (ball) or against it (rocket). Our results showed a perceptual advantage for falling stimuli, irrespective of object identity, suggesting the gravity prior is based on perceptual cues.
Item Type: | Article |
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DOI/Identification number: | 10.1007/s00221-020-05852-5 |
Uncontrolled keywords: | Graviception; Gravity prior; Perception; Visual motion |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology |
Divisions: | Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Psychology |
Depositing User: | Maria Gallagher |
Date Deposited: | 02 Oct 2023 09:26 UTC |
Last Modified: | 05 Nov 2024 13:03 UTC |
Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/98120 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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