Skip to main content
Kent Academic Repository

Evidence and Cognition

Taylor, Samuel D., Williamson, Jon (2022) Evidence and Cognition. Erkenntnis, 89 (5). pp. 1927-1948. ISSN 0165-0106. E-ISSN 1572-8420. (doi:10.1007/s10670-022-00611-0) (KAR id:97326)

Abstract

Cognitive theorists routinely disagree about the evidence supporting claims in cognitive science. Here, we first argue that some disagreements about evidence in cognitive science are about the evidence available to be drawn upon by cognitive theorists. Then, we show that one’s explanation of why this first kind of disagreement obtains will cohere with one’s theory of evidence. We argue that the best explanation for why cognitive theorists disagree in this way is because their evidence is what they rationally grant. Finally, we explain why our view does not lead to a pernicious kind of relativism in cognitive science.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1007/s10670-022-00611-0
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology > BF41 Psychology and philosophy
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > Department of Philosophy
Funders: Leverhulme Trust (https://ror.org/012mzw131)
Depositing User: Jon Williamson
Date Deposited: 06 Oct 2022 19:38 UTC
Last Modified: 16 May 2024 09:28 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/97326 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

University of Kent Author Information

  • Depositors only (login required):

Total unique views for this document in KAR since July 2020. For more details click on the image.