Thesis on time

The concept of time is in some essential and non-trivial way tied up with the issue of "structure". But while there is reason discouraging us from saying that time itself is a structured specificity, (in the manner let's say of McTaggart), nevertheless in some way its meaning consists as a linguistic/conceptual substitute for the idea of structuration of non-tempora1 determinations. Philosophically, we are better off not saying that time pocesses "ontical being" - (to borrow a term from Heidegger) - ie. that time itself is a set of facts to be found "in the world". Yet, at the same time we can not say that time does not exist. What then might the correct manner be so that we can both account for its meaningful description and steer clear of contradictions? So, too, we must say that time is not (simply) an ontological commitment. If we did, we would have to decide on a priviledged starting-point, a set of most fundamental claims about the world which would serve as the grounds from which time is to be inferred. But if different choices would lead to different interpretations of time, on what basis should we account for an independent ontological status for time? In this way time remains bound thematically and is made an inexplicable horizon of whatever structures are assumed to constitute the world. Rather, we must philosophically assert that time meta-logically pre-dates and indeed grounds these logical functions of construing the world as either "factual" or "factical". This, time can do because it is what we might call an "onto-constitutive" function. In addition to the attempt to metaphysically clarify the manner of being of time, I have made specific proposals on and have suggested analyses of the multiple and varying ways that temporal determinations are articulated as modalities. This I let for the reader of the thesis to tackle if he so wishes. I must, however, mention one additional methodological implication so that this very sketchy synopsis of the argument can be rounded off.