A re-examination of Hegel's Science of Logic

I contend that the approach of previous scholars to Hegel's Science of Logic is quite inappropriate. They presuppose that it contains an attempt at the logical deduction of the pure categories of thought, and go on to ask whether this attempt is successful or not. I argue that we ought not to make this presupposition, but ought rather to look more closely at what Hegel actually says and does in the text; this leads me to make a complete re-examination of Hegel's Logic, in which I try to relate the various points I believe Hegel to be making to substantive issues, at the same time comparing and contrasting Hegel's viewpoint to that of other scientists and philosophers, both ancient and modern. Finally, I conclude that Hegel's Logic is not a mere logical deduction of categories, but a critique of concepts productive of a logical hierarchy at the top of which is the concept of philosophical method itself. This critique, then, far from being something we can either take or leave as a whole, is something which itself needs to be looked at critically.