British financial and economic policy towards Germany, 1931-39

This thesis attempts to show the complexity and convoluted nature of Britain's financial and economic relations with Germany in the 1930s. A great variety of influences (often in competition with one another) acted upon policy formulation in Britain. This helped to create different, but seemingly equally valid, opinions as to what constituted the 'national interest'. This, in turn, tended to exacerbate the rivalry which existed between government officials. In particular, the Foreign Office showed extreme hostility to the attitude of the Governor of the Bank of England as the latter attempted to facilitate agreements between Britain and Germany. Such domestic constraints, combined with the economic pre-occupations of the period, prevented policy-makers from developing a clear picture of the nation's interests. A study of bank archives reveals that the extent of the influence of London banks in determining British official policy has been greatly exaggerated. In the face of competition from rival interests, the London banks could not secure any special consideration for their position under the Standstill Agreements from the Government. Thus while the formulation of policy, confronted with the problem of Nazi Germany, showed that political and economic considerations were linked, perhaps to a degree greater than ever before, the indiscriminate use of the term 'economic appeasement' to describe British policy tends to hinder rather than aid historical understanding.