Manufacturer driven strategic coordination as a response to “showrooming”

“Showrooming”, a practice where consumers visit a brick-and-mortar store to examine and research a product before buying it online, is being increasingly observed in recent times. This not only adversely affects the physical store but also the manufacturer in the long run. Showrooming leads to reduced sales efforts on the part of the brick-and-mortar retailer which leads to a decline in showcasing of the product to consumers. This affects the overall demand for the product in the market. In this paper, we analyze the effect of wholesale prices set by the manufacturer on the retail prices of the products in a multi-channel environment affected by showrooming. To combat the adverse impact of showrooming, we further investigate the feasibility of a manufacturer-driven alliance with the brick-and-mortar retailer so that it expends adequate sales effort that leads to higher demand and a dedicated consumer base. We derive a three-parameter contract that can coordinate the channel and arrive at a win-win situation for the manufacturer and the brick-and-mortar retailer. Our analysis shows that the contract is more beneficial for a brick-and-mortar retailer with lower relative market potential. Additionally, we find that the contract brings down the retail price of the product which benefits the end consumers. © 2020 Elsevier B.V.