Philosophical Integrations

Goldstein, Laurence (2004) Philosophical Integrations. Language Sciences, 26 (6). pp. 545-563. ISSN 0388-0001. (doi:10.1016/j.langsci.2004.09.004) (Access to this publication is currently restricted. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:9128)

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.langsci.2004.09.004

Abstract

Our understanding of malapropism is a phenomenon that cries out for explanation, and we here use this phenomenon as a test case to evaluate the plausibility not just of different versions of Integrationism but also of the ‘Language of Thought’ hypothesis and a rival Dynamical Systems approach to modelling the workings of the mind. The verdict: The Roy Harris version of Integrationism (which overlaps interestingly with some views of the philosopher Donald Davidson) is extravagant and implausible and does not cut the mustard. The ‘Language of Thought’ hypothesis is put under severe strain. The Dynamical Systems approach which incorporates the ‘Extended Mind’ hypothesis, sits comfortably with the plausible version of Integrationism that is found in the late writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Item Type:	Article
DOI/Identification number:	10.1016/j.langsci.2004.09.004
Subjects:	P Language and Literature > P Philology. Linguistics
Divisions:	Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > School of Culture and Languages
Depositing User:	Laurence Goldstein
Date Deposited:	13 Sep 2008 19:00 UTC
Last Modified:	05 Nov 2024 09:41 UTC
Resource URI:	https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/9128 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

University of Kent Author Information

Goldstein, Laurence.

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