Basha i Novosejt, Aurelie, McNult, Christopher (2023) Tempered by war: the military experiences of Vietnam decision-makers. The International History Review, 45 (1). pp. 152-166. ISSN 0707-5332. (doi:10.1080/07075332.2022.2115528) (KAR id:91116)
PDF
Publisher pdf
Language: English
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
|
|
Download this file (PDF/1MB) |
Preview |
Request a format suitable for use with assistive technology e.g. a screenreader | |
PDF
Author's Accepted Manuscript
Language: English |
|
Download this file (PDF/340kB) |
Preview |
Request a format suitable for use with assistive technology e.g. a screenreader | |
Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2022.2115528 |
Abstract
The article focuses on three senior decision-makers in the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations that each played a key role in the escalation in Vietnam, namely Walt W. Rostow, Roger Hilsman, and John T. McNaughton. It builds on Andrew Preston’s argument in this journal that the dichotomy between ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ might caricature Vietnam War advisors to suggest the same for the dichotomy between ‘civilians’ and ‘veterans’. Using new material, most notably McNaughton’s wartime diaries and Hilsman’s OSS files, the article suggests that wartime experience was clearly an important formative experience for civilian advisors but in different ways. First, where political scientists tell us that veterans are more likely to espouse certain views, and in particular resist the use force, these examples suggest that proximity to combat - i.e. how much active combat they experienced - mattered more. Second, there was no uniform ‘military’ experience: these advisors were more likely to support the types of tools – i.e. air power or irregular forces - with which they were familiar and only then, if they had become invested in the underlying bureaucratic project of the agency in which they were deployed. In other words, a process of socialization or indoctrination into the armed services happened unevenly. Put together, the examples suggest that the formative experiences in the Second World War cast a long shadow onto the Vietnam War decisions but did so in complex ways.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
DOI/Identification number: | 10.1080/07075332.2022.2115528 |
Uncontrolled keywords: | civil-military relations; Vietnam War; Office of Strategic Services; strategic bombing; John T. McNaughton; Roger Hilsman; Walt W. Rostow; John F. Kennedy |
Subjects: |
E History America J Political Science J Political Science > JK Political institutions and public administration (United States) U Military Science |
Divisions: | Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > School of History |
Funders: | University of Kent (https://ror.org/00xkeyj56) |
Depositing User: | Aurelie Basha i Novosejt |
Date Deposited: | 12 Sep 2022 12:16 UTC |
Last Modified: | 05 Nov 2024 12:56 UTC |
Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/91116 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
- Link to SensusAccess
- Export to:
- RefWorks
- EPrints3 XML
- BibTeX
- CSV
- Depositors only (login required):