Skip to main content

Joint games and compatibility

Assa, H., Elliston, S., Lehrer, E. (2016) Joint games and compatibility. Economic Theory, 61 (1). pp. 91-113. ISSN 0938-2259. (doi:10.1007/s00199-015-0880-0) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:87572)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0880-0

Abstract

We introduce the concepts of joint games and compatibility. In a joint game, members of the grand coalition have the option to split and participate in different underlying games, thereby maximizing their total worths. In order to determine whether the grand coalition will remain intact, we introduce the notion of compatibility of these games. A set of games is compatible if the core of the joint game is non-empty. We find a necessary and sufficient condition for compatibility. © 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1007/s00199-015-0880-0
Subjects: H Social Sciences
Divisions: Divisions > Kent Business School - Division > Department of Accounting and Finance
Depositing User: Hirbod Assa
Date Deposited: 28 Apr 2021 13:36 UTC
Last Modified: 06 Oct 2021 14:34 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/87572 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Assa, H.: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4429-8684
  • Depositors only (login required):