Assa, H., Elliston, S., Lehrer, E. (2016) Joint games and compatibility. Economic Theory, 61 (1). pp. 91-113. ISSN 0938-2259. (doi:10.1007/s00199-015-0880-0) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:87572)
| The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. | |
| Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0880-0 |
Abstract
We introduce the concepts of joint games and compatibility. In a joint game, members of the grand coalition have the option to split and participate in different underlying games, thereby maximizing their total worths. In order to determine whether the grand coalition will remain intact, we introduce the notion of compatibility of these games. A set of games is compatible if the core of the joint game is non-empty. We find a necessary and sufficient condition for compatibility. © 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| DOI/Identification number: | 10.1007/s00199-015-0880-0 |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences |
| Divisions: | Divisions > Kent Business School - Division > Department of Accounting and Finance |
| Depositing User: | Hirbod Assa |
| Date Deposited: | 28 Apr 2021 13:36 UTC |
| Last Modified: | 17 Aug 2022 12:22 UTC |
| Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/87572 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
University of Kent Author Information
Assa, H..
| Creator's ORCID: |
 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4429-8684
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