Cartwright, Edward J, Mirza, Zarak (2019) Charitable giving when donors are constrained to give a minimum amount. Oxford Economic Papers, 73 (1). pp. 295-316. ISSN 0030-7653. (doi:10.1093/oep/gpz063) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:87556)
The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication) | |
Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpz063 |
Abstract
In some instances charities insist on donors giving more than a minimum amount. In other instances charities frame appeals for funds in a way that suggests there is a minimum donation. So, what are the effects on charitable giving if a minimum donation is required? We first provide a simple theoretical model that shows the effects are ambiguous. We then report the results of two lab experiments that consider very different settings. In the first experiment the only incentive to give is intrinsic motivation. Here we find that a minimum constraint lowers giving. The second experiment involves group interaction with extrinsic incentives to give. Here we find that a minimum constraint increases giving. Our results suggest that the effects of a minimum constraint may depend critically on the mix of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
DOI/Identification number: | 10.1093/oep/gpz063 |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences |
Divisions: | Divisions > Kent Business School - Division > Department of Leadership and Management |
Funders: | University of Kent (https://ror.org/00xkeyj56) |
Depositing User: | Tracey Pemble |
Date Deposited: | 29 Apr 2021 14:11 UTC |
Last Modified: | 05 Nov 2024 12:53 UTC |
Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/87556 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
- Export to:
- RefWorks
- EPrints3 XML
- BibTeX
- CSV
- Depositors only (login required):