Moral blindfolds and ethical reflections: imagination, ethics and film

The thesis explores the connection between the imaginative engagement with narrative fiction films, and the imagination as it is employed in moral reasoning. I begin by describing a variety of imaginative and non-imaginative stances towards fiction in terms of a general internal/external schema. I then describe a similar schema as it applies to engaging with fictional characters - imagining from a subjective and an objective perspective. I argue that in both cases - internal/external, and subjective/objective - an either/or choice between them should be rejected in favour of an account that incorporates both perspectives. The second part of the thesis begins with an account of how the internal/external distinction is related to the question of how, or if, narrative fiction films can be sources of moral knowledge. I consider the idea that films can act as 'thought-experiments' (the ITE thesis) and find it lacking. I argue, however, that the idea should not be rejected but modified. I do so with reference to Bernard Williams' distinction between 'thick' and 'thin' ethical concepts, and I show that re-conceiving films as examples of thick ethical concepts meets the objections that I have levelled at the FTE thesis. It also, I claim, satisfies the condition that if films are to have moral-cognitive value, that value must be tied in a substantial way to their aesthetic properties. I then go on to discuss in chapter four what might seem the most natural ethical function of engaging with fictions - coming to know 'what it's like'. Subjective imagining, or empathising, I argue is not intrinsically beneficial, but becomes so when it is conducted within a more objective context. The final two chapters are a more detailed discussion of Eric Rohmer's series of films Les Contes Moreaux/The Moral Tales in which I flesh out some of the theoretical claims of the thesis, and connect them to a tradition of ironic realism exemplified by Rohmer's series.