Korea-U.S. trade negotiation on market access: dispute over the Korean shelf-life regulations for food products

This study questions the salient variables in the settlement of trade disputes arising from the market access problem between Korea and the United States. An examination of previous research on Korea-U.S. trade disputes finds that no single research approach provided a complete explanation of them. Examination of the bilateral negotiations left some unexplained 'black boxes.' This study therefore develops a synthesised framework for analysis that combines distinct levels of analysis: state power (structural); institutional frameworks (the state); and lobby groups (public choice). Furthermore, it operationalises the new framework for analysis by identifying the following three variables within the trade dispute between the two countries: negotiation power, government trade agencies, and interest groups. Part I outlines the historical evolution of the economic relations of the two countries in the context of the way in which the relations have changed over the years. This section provides the theoretical framework for the following case study. * Part II traces the negotiation process of the case in greater detail. It begins with a brief account of the case. It shows the basic positions of the four actors involved in the case: the two main interest groups and the two governments. Subsequent chapters respectively trace the negotiations under the informal diplomatic process, Section 301 procedure, and the WTO dispute settlement procedure. Particular attention is given to the interactions between the actors in the bilateral negotiation process as well as in the domestic process of each country. The deadlocks and success of the negotiations are analysed in the context of the three variables. The case analysis finds that all the three variables influenced the process and outcomes of the negotiations, and further shows the basic mechanism of the interrelationship of the variables. This study concludes that in order to gain a clearer picture of Korea-U.S. market access disputes, it is necessary to see them at least through the different angles of the three variables. Based on this conclusion, this study proposes some policy alternatives to strengthen the negotiation power of Korea.