Rethinking retirement : the politics of pension reform in Britain, Switzerland and France

This study is concerned with the impact that political institutions can have on welfare reforms. It compares recent pension reforms adopted in three countries - the UK, France and Switzerland - characterised by very different constitutional arrangements. In each country, governments shared similar concerns for the medium and long term financing of state pensions, and were equally committed to achieve savings through a partial rethinking of pension policy. However, the three governments were operating in substantially different institutional environments, and developed different strategies in order to achieve a common goal.

In the UK, thanks to a constitutional structure which concentrates power in the hands of the government, the latter was able to impose changes in face of widespread public opposition. In contrast, in Switzerland, the high level of power fragmentation generated by its political institutions forced the majority to combine saving measures with elements of expansion. Finally France, which as far as constitutional arrangements comes somewhere between the two, managed to adopt a (negotiated) reform when, because of contingent political factors, power concentration was low, but failed when it was higher.

The study concludes by arguing that political institutions are an important factor which affects the selection of a given strategy in pension reform. However, their impact is mediated by a series of other contingencies that can influence the level of power concentration. Of particular relevance are electoral results, which can strengthen or weaken the bargaining power of a government, and the position in the electoral cycle at the time of reform.