Coercive diplomacy : the Nkomati accord between Mozambique and South Africa

The independence gained by Angola and by Mozambique in 1974 and by Zimbabwe in 1980 caused a 'security vacuum' for the Republic of South Africa, since it had lost its buffer zone. Accompanying these events, there was an upsurge in guerrilla activities led by the ANC, PAC and SWAPO with the support of the FLS. In response to these developments, South Africa implemented a strategy of coercion designed to deal with any threat to its internal security and maintain its external influence as a regional power. In the 1980's, therefore, the region has witnessed an escalating pattern of coercion, aggression and destabilisation by Pretoria, aimed against the independent Southern African countries. These policies have had a devastating effect on the stability of the region as a whole, as well as on the economic, political, military and the like developments of the FLS-SADCC countries. The aim of this study is to investigate the nature of this coercive diplomacy exercised by the South African government in Southern Africa. The best example of South Africa's strategy of coercion is the signing of the Nkomati Accord in 1984 with Mozambique. The reasons behind Mozambique's signing of the Accord are examined in detail and the reactions of the FLS are presented and analysed. These reactions are drawn from interviews conducted by the researcher in Southern Africa in 1988. They deal with the implication of the signing of the Accord for the solidarity of the FLS and their support of the liberation movements.