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Truth-Predicates Still Not like Pronouns: a Reply to Salis

Båve, Arvid (2019) Truth-Predicates Still Not like Pronouns: a Reply to Salis. Philosophia, 47 (5). pp. 1421-1429. ISSN 0048-3893. (doi:10.1007/s11406-019-00081-9) (KAR id:79212)

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Official URL
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00081-9

Abstract

I here respond to Pietro Salis’s objections against my original critique of the Prosentential Theory of Truth. In addition, I clarify some points regarding the relationship between anaphoric relationships and “general semantic notions” like “equivalence”, “consequence”, and “sameness of content”, and make some further points about ’s ability gto explain pragmatic and expressive features of “true”.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1007/s11406-019-00081-9
Uncontrolled keywords: Truth ; Prosentential ; Grover ; Belnap ; Brandom ; Salis ; Anaphor ; Pronoun
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages
Depositing User: Arvid Bave
Date Deposited: 07 Dec 2019 22:03 UTC
Last Modified: 16 Feb 2021 14:10 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/79212 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Båve, Arvid: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7570-2697
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