Båve, Arvid (2019) Truth-Predicates Still Not like Pronouns: a Reply to Salis. Philosophia, 47 (5). pp. 1421-1429. ISSN 0048-3893. (doi:10.1007/s11406-019-00081-9) (KAR id:79212)
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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00081-9 |
Abstract
I here respond to Pietro Salis’s objections against my original critique of the Prosentential Theory of Truth. In addition, I clarify some points regarding the relationship between anaphoric relationships and “general semantic notions” like “equivalence”, “consequence”, and “sameness of content”, and make some further points about ’s ability gto explain pragmatic and expressive features of “true”.
Item Type: | Article |
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DOI/Identification number: | 10.1007/s11406-019-00081-9 |
Uncontrolled keywords: | Truth ; Prosentential ; Grover ; Belnap ; Brandom ; Salis ; Anaphor ; Pronoun |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
Divisions: | Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > School of Culture and Languages |
Depositing User: | Arvid Bave |
Date Deposited: | 07 Dec 2019 22:03 UTC |
Last Modified: | 05 Nov 2024 12:44 UTC |
Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/79212 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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