Casier, Tom (2019) Russia and the European Union. . Oxford University Press Text. 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1051. (doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1051) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:77098)
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.0... |
Abstract
Relations between the European Union (EU) and Russia have gone through a dramatic journey from close partnership to confrontation. The narratives of the crisis that erupted over Ukraine in late 2013 and early 2014 are diametrically opposed. The root causes of the crisis are primarily related to colliding visions of the European order that have existed ever since the end of the Cold War. Yet, to understand why the escalation happened at that time, one also needs to understand the dynamics of a process of increasing tensions and dwindling trust. The Ukraine crisis was thus both the outcome of an escalation of tensions and a radical rupture.
In the run-up to the Ukraine crisis (2003–2013), EU–Russia relations were characterized by a Strategic Partnership. The latter was launched in 2003, closing a decade of asymmetrical EU-centric cooperation and redressing the balance in a formally equal partnership, based on pragmatic cooperation and a recognition of mutual interests. Despite high aspirations, the Strategic Partnership gradually derailed into a logic of competition. Tensions eventually crystallized around colliding integration projects: the Eastern Partnership (aiming at Association Agreements) on the EU’s side and the Eurasian Economic Union on Russia’s side. The crisis erupted specifically as the result of the choice Ukraine had to make between the two options. This choice radicalized the negative geopolitical reading that Moscow and Brussels had gradually developed of each other’s behavior.
Since the start of the Ukraine crisis (2014), EU–Russia relations have been characterized by a harsh confrontation in the field of high politics. The Strategic Partnership was suspended and the EU imposed sanctions in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Ukraine. Moscow retaliated and relations became highly acrimonious. Security-related issues dominate the agenda: Russia accuses the West of neo-containment, while Moscow is blamed for undermining the pan-European border regime and security order.
The stalemate between Russia and the EU (and by extension the Euro-Atlantic Community) is ambivalent. On the one hand, it has taken the form of a systemic crisis, where both parties risk running from incident to incident in the absence of effective pan-European instruments that may constrain or reverse the conflict. On the other hand, in the field of low politics, in particular trade and energy, business often seems to continue as usual.
Item Type: | Internet publication |
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DOI/Identification number: | 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1051 |
Uncontrolled keywords: | European Union, European Union politics, Russia, Strategic Partnership, Ukraine crisis, foreign policy, energy, trade, security |
Subjects: | J Political Science > JZ International relations |
Divisions: | Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Politics and International Relations |
Depositing User: | Tom Casier |
Date Deposited: | 07 Oct 2019 17:21 UTC |
Last Modified: | 05 Nov 2024 12:41 UTC |
Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/77098 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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