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A game-theoretic model of coalition formation among primates

Stamatopoulos, G., Sengupta, A., Vogel, E., Janson, C. (2009) A game-theoretic model of coalition formation among primates. Journal of Bioeconomics, 11 (2). pp. 165-183. ISSN 1387-6996. (doi:10.1007/s10818-009-9060-2) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:71504)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided.
Official URL:
https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10818-009-9060-2

Abstract

This paper models the coalition formation process among primates as a sequential game. The population consists of individuals having distinct social ranks which is determined by the individual's resource holding potential. Each member of the population is interested in gaining access to a food resource, either individually or via a coalition. At any given stage of the game, a player can either propose a specific coalition or he can be proposed to in order to join one. Hence, the strategy of a player consists of a sequence of decisions regarding who to propose to for the formation of a coalition and which proposals to accept or reject. We derive the preferences of the players over the various coalition structures under the assumption that the probability of a coalition to obtain the resource is given by a logistic distribution as a function of relative strengths of the players. We show that, given the primates' strategic behavior, a variety of different coalition structures can emerge in equilibrium.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1007/s10818-009-9060-2
Uncontrolled keywords: decision analysis; game theory; group behavior; hierarchical system; numerical model; primate; probability; ranking; resource allocation; resource management, Primates
Subjects: H Social Sciences
H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Divisions: Divisions > Kent Business School - Division > Kent Business School (do not use)
Depositing User: Abhijit Sengupta
Date Deposited: 03 Jan 2019 12:04 UTC
Last Modified: 16 Nov 2021 10:25 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/71504 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

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