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Assessing belief-attribution in adults with and without Autism Spectrum Disorders using a computerised false-belief task.

Bradford, Elisabeth E.F., Hukker, Vera, Smith, Laura, Ferguson, Heather J. (2018) Assessing belief-attribution in adults with and without Autism Spectrum Disorders using a computerised false-belief task. In: Experimental Psychology Society January Meeting, 2018, January 2018, London, UK. (Unpublished) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:70343)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)

Abstract

Throughout our day-to-day lives, we need to infer information about the contents of other people’s minds, such as what they can see and what they know, in order to engage in successful interactions. This is referred to as possession of a ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM). Past research has shown that adults with Autistic Spectrum Disorders often show a deficit in general social communication abilities, although can successfully pass some tests of ToM. The current study used a computerized false-belief task to explore subtle differences in belief-attribution capacities, a core part of ToM, in adults with and without autism. In the task, participants were asked to attribute a belief-state to either themselves or another person, following establishment of a true or false-belief scenario (i.e., contents of a container revealed to be either expected, such as sugar in a sugar jar, or unexpected, such as marbles in a sugar jar). Results revealed comparable speed of processing between groups, however autistic individuals showed a particular deficit in correctly identifying a belief-state in false-belief trials, in which two contrasting belief-states had to be held in mind (i.e., outdated belief vs. reality state), suggesting more difficulty disengaging from current, reality based belief-states than neuro-typical individuals.

Item Type: Conference or workshop item (Speech)
Uncontrolled keywords: Social Cognition; Autism; Theory of Mind
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Psychology
Depositing User: Lizzie Bradford
Date Deposited: 26 Nov 2018 11:48 UTC
Last Modified: 16 Feb 2021 13:59 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/70343 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

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