Ioannou, Christos A., Makris, Miltiadis (2019) An Experimental Study of Uncertainty in Coordination Games. International Economic Review, 60 (2). pp. 751-799. ISSN 0020-6598. E-ISSN 1468-2354. (doi:10.1111/iere.12367) (KAR id:69581)
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org//10.1111/iere.12367 |
Abstract
Global games and Poisson games have been proposed to address equilibrium indeterminacy in Common Knowledge Coordination games. The present study investigates in a controlled setup, using as controls Common Knowledge games, whether idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals (Global games) or uncertainty about the number of actual players (Poisson games) may influence subjects' behavior. We find that uncertainty about the number of actual players has more influence on subjects' behavior than idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals. Furthermore, subjects' behavior under Poisson population?size uncertainty is closer to the respective theoretical prediction than subjects' behavior under idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic fundamentals.
Item Type: | Article |
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DOI/Identification number: | 10.1111/iere.12367 |
Uncontrolled keywords: | Coordination games, population uncertainty, experiments |
Subjects: |
H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HG Finance |
Divisions: | Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Economics |
Depositing User: | Miltos Makris |
Date Deposited: | 15 Oct 2018 16:01 UTC |
Last Modified: | 05 Nov 2024 12:31 UTC |
Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/69581 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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