Jansen, Claudia (2018) Moral objectivity: Kant, Hume and psychopathy. Master of Philosophy (MPhil) thesis, University of Kent,. (KAR id:66548)
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Abstract
Moral objectivity is about genuinely better or worse courses of action and states of affairs in
that is maximally independent of subjectivity (at least if the threat of relativism is to be
justifications that are devoid of subjectivity. Every account of objective moral justifications
such justifications enter the universe?
moral objectivity are overambitious. I offer three lines of argument that point to moral
in Hume's (exclusively psychological) conception of 'reason'. It is paradigmatically well
The second and third lines of argument are grounded in research about the nature
judgements about good practical lives. The third is about libertarian freedom over innately
others in evaluative decision-making. Due to conceptual and empirical problems about
further conceptual and empirical attention.
contains a critical reflection on methodological aspects of the contemporary meta-ethical
deeper involvement with theoretical claims about human nature.
Item Type: | Thesis (Master of Philosophy (MPhil)) |
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Thesis advisor: | Kirchin, Simon T. |
Thesis advisor: | Corfield, David |
Uncontrolled keywords: | Kant, Hume |
Divisions: |
Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy |
SWORD Depositor: | System Moodle |
Depositing User: | System Moodle |
Date Deposited: | 27 Mar 2018 11:10 UTC |
Last Modified: | 29 May 2019 20:24 UTC |
Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/66548 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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