Moral objectivity: Kant, Hume and psychopathy

Moral objectivity is about genuinely better or worse courses of action and states of affairs in

the moral domain. It seems good to aim at an identification of objective moral justifications

that is maximally independent of subjectivity (at least if the threat of relativism is to be

avoided). Having said that, it seems problematic to accept objective discriminations or

justifications that are devoid of subjectivity. Every account of objective moral justifications

seems in need of some sort of relationship with naturalistic human minds. How else could

such justifications enter the universe?

In this study I build towards arguments for deciding when claims about the status of

moral objectivity are overambitious. I offer three lines of argument that point to moral

objectivity being essentially anti-realist and (as such) mind-dependent. The first is grounded

in Hume's (exclusively psychological) conception of 'reason'. It is paradigmatically well

illustrated by Kant's philosophy.

The second and third lines of argument are grounded in research about the nature

and etiology of psychopathy. The second is about conceptual relativity regarding normative

judgements about good practical lives. The third is about libertarian freedom over innately

given components, components crucial to the psychological possibility of taking account of

others in evaluative decision-making. Due to conceptual and empirical problems about

(possible worlds of) human nature, which will be laid out, these two lines of argument need

further conceptual and empirical attention.

Additional to my constructive theory about the limits of moral objectivity, my study

contains a critical reflection on methodological aspects of the contemporary meta-ethical

debate. Overall, my study is a critical call for better reflection on the concept 'reason' and a

deeper involvement with theoretical claims about human nature.