Couto, Alexandra (2015) Luck Egalitarianism and What Valuing Responsibility Requires. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 21 (2). pp. 193-217. ISSN 1369-8230. E-ISSN 1743-8772. (doi:10.1080/13698230.2015.1101824) (Access to this publication is currently restricted. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:64006)
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2015.1101824 |
Abstract
Luck egalitarianism originated in an attempt to respond to the conservative objection that egalitarianism fails to respect the value of responsibility. In response, luck egalitarians have introduced a distinction between choice and circumstances and recommend redistribution only when inequalities are not the result of choice. I will argue, however, that this standard formulation of the luck egalitarian aim is problematic, and ought to be revised. Valuing responsibility requires more than redistribution – it requires giving priority to ensuring equality of opportunity for advantages at the level of institutions. Preventing unfairness has normative priority over efforts to alleviate it. Compensation’s role is secondary to the prior normative importance of ensuring that people are responsible for the advantages they have.
Item Type: | Article |
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DOI/Identification number: | 10.1080/13698230.2015.1101824 |
Uncontrolled keywords: | luck egalitarianism, responsibility, equality of opportunity, justice |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion |
Divisions: | Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > School of Culture and Languages |
Depositing User: | Alexandra Couto |
Date Deposited: | 13 Oct 2017 19:42 UTC |
Last Modified: | 05 Nov 2024 11:00 UTC |
Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/64006 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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