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Perverse incentives risk undermining biodiversity offset policies

Gordon, Ascelin, Bull, Joseph, Wilcox, Chris, Maron, Martine, Banks-Leite, Cristina (2015) Perverse incentives risk undermining biodiversity offset policies. Journal of Applied Ecology, 52 (2). pp. 532-537. ISSN 0021-8901. E-ISSN 1365-2664. (doi:10.1111/1365-2664.12398) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:63799)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided.
Official URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1365-2664.12398

Abstract

1. Offsetting is emerging as an important but controversial approach for managing environment– development conflicts. Biodiversity offsets are designed to compensate for damage to biodiversity from development by providing biodiversity gains elsewhere.

2. Here, we suggest how biodiversity offset policies can generate behaviours that exacerbate biodiversity decline, and identify four perverse incentives that could arise even from soundly designed policies.

3. These include incentives for (i) entrenching or exacerbating baseline biodiversity declines, (ii) winding back non-offset conservation actions, (iii) crowding out of conservation volunteerism and (iv) false public confidence in environmental outcomes due to marketing offset actions as gains.

4. Synthesis and applications. Despite its goal of improving biodiversity outcomes, there is potential for best-practice offsetting to achieve the opposite result. Reducing this risk requires coupling offset crediting baselines to measured trajectories of biodiversity change and understanding the potential interaction between offsetting and other environmental policies.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1111/1365-2664.12398
Uncontrolled keywords: baseline, biodiversity offset, carbon offset, crediting baseline, offset policy, perverse incentive, policy evaluation
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Anthropology and Conservation
Depositing User: Joseph Bull
Date Deposited: 05 Oct 2017 08:46 UTC
Last Modified: 05 Nov 2024 10:59 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/63799 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

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