Contempt, as any other social affect, can be an emotion as well as a sentiment

Giner-Sorolla, Roger and Fischer, Agneta H. (2017) Contempt, as any other social affect, can be an emotion as well as a sentiment. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 40 (e237). ISSN 0140-525X. E-ISSN 1469-1825. (doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X16000765) (Access to this publication is currently restricted. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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Abstract

Gervais and Fessler assert that contempt is (a) not an emotion (or an attitude), but (b) a sentiment. Here, we challenge the validity and empirical basis of these two assertions, arguing that contempt, as many other emotions, can be both an emotion and sentiment.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled keywords: contempt, emotions, sentiments, theory
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Psychology
Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Psychology > Social Psychology
Depositing User: Roger Giner-Sorolla
Date Deposited: 22 Mar 2017 16:17 UTC
Last Modified: 14 Nov 2017 12:31 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/61003 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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