Contempt, as any other social affect, can be an emotion as well as a sentiment

Giner-Sorolla, Roger, Fischer, Agneta H. (2017) Contempt, as any other social affect, can be an emotion as well as a sentiment. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 40 . Article Number 237. ISSN 0140-525X. E-ISSN 1469-1825. (doi:10.1017/S0140525X16000765) (Access to this publication is currently restricted. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:61003)

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X16000765

Abstract

Gervais and Fessler assert that contempt is (a) not an emotion (or an attitude), but (b) a sentiment. Here, we challenge the validity and empirical basis of these two assertions, arguing that contempt, as many other emotions, can be both an emotion and sentiment.

Item Type:	Article
DOI/Identification number:	10.1017/S0140525X16000765
Uncontrolled keywords:	contempt, emotions, sentiments, theory
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions:	Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Psychology
Depositing User:	Roger Giner-Sorolla
Date Deposited:	22 Mar 2017 16:17 UTC
Last Modified:	05 Nov 2024 10:54 UTC
Resource URI:	https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/61003 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

University of Kent Author Information

Giner-Sorolla, Roger.

Creator's ORCID:	https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6690-8842
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