Giner-Sorolla, Roger, Fischer, Agneta H. (2017) Contempt, as any other social affect, can be an emotion as well as a sentiment. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 40 . Article Number 237. ISSN 0140-525X. E-ISSN 1469-1825. (doi:10.1017/S0140525X16000765) (Access to this publication is currently restricted. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:61003)
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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X16000765 |
Abstract
Gervais and Fessler assert that contempt is (a) not an emotion (or an attitude), but (b) a sentiment. Here, we challenge the validity and empirical basis of these two assertions, arguing that contempt, as many other emotions, can be both an emotion and sentiment.
Item Type: | Article |
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DOI/Identification number: | 10.1017/S0140525X16000765 |
Uncontrolled keywords: | contempt, emotions, sentiments, theory |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology |
Divisions: | Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Psychology |
Depositing User: | Roger Giner-Sorolla |
Date Deposited: | 22 Mar 2017 16:17 UTC |
Last Modified: | 04 Mar 2024 17:42 UTC |
Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/61003 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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