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On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games

Allouch, Nizar, Wooders, Myrna (2017) On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games. Economic Theory, 63 (1). pp. 191-209. ISSN 0938-2259. E-ISSN 1432-0479. (doi:10.1007/s00199-016-1010-3) (KAR id:60637)


We provide a new proof of the nonemptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their “balanced cover games,” which are nonempty, can be approximated by equal-treatment \varepsilon ? -cores of the games themselves. Our proof is novel in that we develop a limiting payoff possibilities set and rely on a fixed point theorem.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1007/s00199-016-1010-3
Uncontrolled keywords: NTU games; Core; Approximate cores; Small group effectiveness; Coalition formation; Payoff-dependent balancedness
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Nizar Allouch
Date Deposited: 01 Mar 2017 16:21 UTC
Last Modified: 04 Mar 2024 18:49 UTC
Resource URI: (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

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