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Imitation, coordination and the emergence of Nash equilibrium

Cartwright, Edward (2007) Imitation, coordination and the emergence of Nash equilibrium. International Journal of Game Theory, 36 (1). pp. 119-135. ISSN 0020-7276. (doi:10.1007/s00182-007-0077-2) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:507)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided.
Official URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0077-2

Abstract

We consider a learning dynamic in which players imitate and better reply. Sufficient conditions are provided for Nash equilibrium play to emerge over time. The role of imitation in the learning dynamic is discussed through a series of examples. Most interestingly we demonstrate how imitation can 'help' the emergence of Nash equilibrium where 'more rational' methods do not.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1007/s00182-007-0077-2
Uncontrolled keywords: imitation; better reply; coordination games; Nash equilibrium
Subjects: H Social Sciences
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: C. Hudson
Date Deposited: 19 Dec 2007 18:18 UTC
Last Modified: 16 Nov 2021 09:39 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/507 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

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