Cartwright, Edward (2007) Imitation, coordination and the emergence of Nash equilibrium. International Journal of Game Theory, 36 (1). pp. 119-135. ISSN 0020-7276. (doi:10.1007/s00182-007-0077-2) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:507)
| The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. | |
| Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0077-2 |
Abstract
We consider a learning dynamic in which players imitate and better reply. Sufficient conditions are provided for Nash equilibrium play to emerge over time. The role of imitation in the learning dynamic is discussed through a series of examples. Most interestingly we demonstrate how imitation can 'help' the emergence of Nash equilibrium where 'more rational' methods do not.
| Item Type: | Article |
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| DOI/Identification number: | 10.1007/s00182-007-0077-2 |
| Uncontrolled keywords: | imitation; better reply; coordination games; Nash equilibrium |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences |
| Divisions: | Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Economics |
| Depositing User: | C. Hudson |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Dec 2007 18:18 UTC |
| Last Modified: | 05 Nov 2024 09:30 UTC |
| Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/507 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
University of Kent Author Information
Cartwright, Edward.
| Creator's ORCID: |
 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0194-9368
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