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The Stability of conventions: random and lattice matching networks compared

Cartwright, Edward (2004) The Stability of conventions: random and lattice matching networks compared. Economics Letters, 85 (1). pp. 47-51. (doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2004.03.019) (Access to this publication is currently restricted. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:505)

Language: English

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We consider the stability of the risk-dominant equilibrium in a two-strategy coordination game when players behave myopically. The case of a lattice matching network is compared to that of a random network. We demonstrate that the risk-dominant equilibrium is unstable given a lattice network and stable given a random network.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1016/j.econlet.2004.03.019
Subjects: H Social Sciences
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Edward Cartwright
Date Deposited: 19 Dec 2007 18:17 UTC
Last Modified: 16 Nov 2021 09:39 UTC
Resource URI: (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

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