The Stability of conventions: random and lattice matching networks compared

Cartwright, Edward (2004) The Stability of conventions: random and lattice matching networks compared. Economics Letters, 85 (1). pp. 47-51. (doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2004.03.019) (Access to this publication is currently restricted. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:505)

PDF Language: English Restricted to Repository staff only

Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.03.019

Abstract

We consider the stability of the risk-dominant equilibrium in a two-strategy coordination game when players behave myopically. The case of a lattice matching network is compared to that of a random network. We demonstrate that the risk-dominant equilibrium is unstable given a lattice network and stable given a random network.

Item Type:	Article
DOI/Identification number:	10.1016/j.econlet.2004.03.019
Subjects:	H Social Sciences
Institutional Unit:	Schools > School of Economics and Politics and International Relations > Economics
Former Institutional Unit:	Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User:	Edward Cartwright
Date Deposited:	19 Dec 2007 18:17 UTC
Last Modified:	20 May 2025 12:36 UTC
Resource URI:	https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/505 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

University of Kent Author Information

Cartwright, Edward.

Creator's ORCID:	https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0194-9368
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