Accounting for Experiences as of Passage: Why Topology Isn’t Enough

Forbes, Graeme A (2014) Accounting for Experiences as of Passage: Why Topology Isn’t Enough. Topoi, 34 (1). pp. 187-194. ISSN 0167-7411. (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-014-9254-7) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-014-9254-7

Abstract

Time appears to us to pass. Some philosophers think that we should account for these experiences by appeal to change in what there unrestrictedly is (i.e. ontological change). I argue that such an appeal can only be the beginning of an account of passage. To show this, I consider a minimal type of view—a purely topological view—that attempts to account for experiences as of passage by an appeal to ontological change and topological features of the present. I argue that, if ontological change is needed to account for our experiences as of passage, then there are other features of our experiences as of passage that a purely topological view does not have the resources to explain. These features include the implacability of time’s passage, the orderliness of time’s passage, and the impossibility of a having a past that was never present.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Graeme A Forbes
Date Deposited: 13 Apr 2015 09:53 UTC
Last Modified: 24 Feb 2017 12:15 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/47948 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
  • Depositors only (login required):