Against The Bifurcation Of Virtue

Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer (2015) Against The Bifurcation Of Virtue. Nous, 51 (2). pp. 291-301. ISSN 0029-4624. E-ISSN 1468-0068. (doi:10.1111/nous.12102) (KAR id:47947)

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/nous.12102

Abstract

It has become customary in the virtue epistemological literature to distinguish between responsibilist and reliabilist virtue theories. More recently, certain problems affecting the former have prompted epistemologists to suggest that this distinction in virtue theory maps on to a distinction in virtue, specifically between character and faculty virtue. I argue that we lack good reason to bifurcate virtue in this manner, and that this moreover counts in favor of the virtue reliabilist.

Item Type:	Article
DOI/Identification number:	10.1111/nous.12102
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions:	Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > School of Culture and Languages
Depositing User:	Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij
Date Deposited:	12 Apr 2015 09:39 UTC
Last Modified:	05 Nov 2024 10:31 UTC
Resource URI:	https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/47947 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

University of Kent Author Information

Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer.

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