Skip to main content

On the Emergence of Social Norms

Cartwright, Edward (2007) On the Emergence of Social Norms. Discussion paper. University of Kent, Canterbury


We consider a model of conformity that permits a non-conformist

equilibrium and multiple conformist equilibria. Agents are assumed

to behave according to a best reply learning dynamic. We detail the

conditions under which a social norm and conformity emerge. The

emergence of conformity depends on the distribution of intrinsic preferences,

the relative costs and benefits of conformity and the topology

of agent interaction.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion paper)
Additional information: Discussion Paper No. 07/04
Uncontrolled keywords: Social norms, conformity, best reply JEL classification: C7, D11
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Suzanne Duffy
Date Deposited: 22 Jul 2008 17:07 UTC
Last Modified: 01 Aug 2019 10:30 UTC
Resource URI: (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Cartwright, Edward:
  • Depositors only (login required):


Downloads per month over past year