Cartwright, Edward (2007) On the Emergence of Social Norms. Discussion paper. University of Kent, Canterbury (KAR id:4620)
PDF
Language: English |
|
Download (420kB)
Preview
|
Preview |
This file may not be suitable for users of assistive technology.
Request an accessible format
|
|
Official URL: http://www.kent.ac.uk/economics/papers/papers-pdf/... |
Abstract
We consider a model of conformity that permits a non-conformist
equilibrium and multiple conformist equilibria. Agents are assumed
to behave according to a best reply learning dynamic. We detail the
conditions under which a social norm and conformity emerge. The
emergence of conformity depends on the distribution of intrinsic preferences,
the relative costs and benefits of conformity and the topology
of agent interaction.
Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion paper) |
---|---|
Additional information: | Discussion Paper No. 07/04 |
Uncontrolled keywords: | Social norms, conformity, best reply JEL classification: C7, D11 |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Economics |
Depositing User: | Suzanne Duffy |
Date Deposited: | 22 Jul 2008 17:07 UTC |
Last Modified: | 16 Nov 2021 09:42 UTC |
Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/4620 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
Cartwright, Edward: | ![]() |
- Link to SensusAccess
- Export to:
- RefWorks
- EPrints3 XML
- BibTeX
- CSV
- Depositors only (login required):