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On the Emergence of Social Norms

Cartwright, Edward (2007) On the Emergence of Social Norms. Discussion paper. University of Kent, Canterbury (KAR id:4620)

Language: English
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We consider a model of conformity that permits a non-conformist

equilibrium and multiple conformist equilibria. Agents are assumed

to behave according to a best reply learning dynamic. We detail the

conditions under which a social norm and conformity emerge. The

emergence of conformity depends on the distribution of intrinsic preferences,

the relative costs and benefits of conformity and the topology

of agent interaction.

Item Type: Monograph (Discussion paper)
Additional information: Discussion Paper No. 07/04
Uncontrolled keywords: Social norms, conformity, best reply JEL classification: C7, D11
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Suzanne Duffy
Date Deposited: 22 Jul 2008 17:07 UTC
Last Modified: 16 Nov 2021 09:42 UTC
Resource URI: (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Cartwright, Edward:
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