Cartwright, Edward (2007) On the Emergence of Social Norms. Discussion paper. University of Kent, Canterbury (KAR id:4620)
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| Official URL: http://www.kent.ac.uk/economics/papers/papers-pdf/... |
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Abstract
We consider a model of conformity that permits a non-conformist
equilibrium and multiple conformist equilibria. Agents are assumed
to behave according to a best reply learning dynamic. We detail the
conditions under which a social norm and conformity emerge. The
emergence of conformity depends on the distribution of intrinsic preferences,
the relative costs and benefits of conformity and the topology
of agent interaction.
| Item Type: | Reports and Papers (Discussion paper) |
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| Additional information: | Discussion Paper No. 07/04 |
| Uncontrolled keywords: | Social norms, conformity, best reply JEL classification: C7, D11 |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Institutional Unit: | Schools > School of Economics and Politics and International Relations > Economics |
| Former Institutional Unit: |
Divisions > Division of Computing, Engineering and Mathematical Sciences > School of Economics Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Economics
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| Depositing User: | Suzanne Duffy |
| Date Deposited: | 22 Jul 2008 17:07 UTC |
| Last Modified: | 20 May 2025 12:37 UTC |
| Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/4620 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0194-9368
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