Patel, Amrish, Cartwright, Edward (2012) Naïve Beliefs and the Multiplicity of Social Norms. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 168 (2). pp. 280-289. ISSN 0932-4569. (doi:10.1628/093245612800933942) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:36863)
The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. | |
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/093245612800933942 |
Abstract
In a signalling model of conformity, we demonstrate that naïve observers, those that take actions at face value, constrain the set of actions that can possibly be social norms. With rational observers many actions can be norms, but with naïve observers only actions close to that preferred by the ideal type can be norms. We suggest, therefore, that the naïvety or inexperience of observers is an important determinant of norms and how they evolve.
Item Type: | Article |
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DOI/Identification number: | 10.1628/093245612800933942 |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Economics |
Depositing User: | Edward Cartwright |
Date Deposited: | 23 Nov 2013 11:38 UTC |
Last Modified: | 05 Nov 2024 10:20 UTC |
Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/36863 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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