Leadership by Example in the Weak-link Game

Cartwright, Edward and Gillet, Joris and Van Vugt, Mark (2013) Leadership by Example in the Weak-link Game. Economic Inquiry , 51 (4). pp. 2028-2043. ISSN 1465-7295. (doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12003) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12003

Abstract

We investigate the effects of leadership in a four-player weak-link game. A weak-link game is a coordination game with multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. Because the more efficient equilibria involve a degree of strategic uncertainty groups typically find it difficult to coordinate on more efficient equilibria. We wanted to see whether leadership by example, in the form of one player acting publicly before the rest of the group, could help groups do better. Our results suggest that leadership can increase efficiency but is far from being a guarantee of success. Specifically, in a significant number of groups we observed successful leadership and increased efficiency, but in most groups efficiency was low despite the efforts of leaders. We did not find any difference between voluntary leaders and leaders that are randomly assigned.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled keywords: Leadership, coordination, weak link game
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Edward Cartwright
Date Deposited: 23 Nov 2013 09:03 UTC
Last Modified: 23 Apr 2014 13:03 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/36841 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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