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Cheating to win: Dishonesty and the intensity of competition

Cartwright, Edward, Menezes, Matheus L.C. (2014) Cheating to win: Dishonesty and the intensity of competition. Economics Letters, 122 (1). pp. 55-58. ISSN 0165-1765. (doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.016) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:36839)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided.
Official URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.016

Abstract

We argue that the intensity of competition within a group or organization can have an important influence on whether or not people cheat. To make this point we first work through a simple model of strategic misreporting in the workplace. For low and high levels of competition we show that, in equilibrium, few are predicted to misreport. It is for medium levels of competition that misreporting is predicted to be highest. We test this prediction experimentally and find good support for it. This finding has implications for the design of incentive structures within groups and organizations.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.016
Uncontrolled keywords: Cheating; Deception; Misreporting; Competition; Lying
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Edward Cartwright
Date Deposited: 23 Nov 2013 08:49 UTC
Last Modified: 17 Aug 2022 10:56 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/36839 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

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