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Theory of own mind in autism: Evidence of a specific deficit in self-awareness?

Williams, David M. (2010) Theory of own mind in autism: Evidence of a specific deficit in self-awareness? Autism: International Journal of Research and Practice, 14 (5). pp. 474-494. ISSN 1461-7005. (doi:10.1177/1362361310366314) (KAR id:34004)

Abstract

Assuming that self-awareness is not a unitary phenomenon, and that one can be aware of different aspects of self at any one time, it follows that selective impairments in self-awareness can occur. This paper explores the idea that autism involves a particular deficit in awareness of the “psychological self”, or “theory of own mind”. This hypothesised deficit renders individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) at least as impaired at recognising their own mental states as at recognising mental states in other people. This deficit, it is argued, stands in contrast to an apparently typical awareness of the “physical self” amongst people with autism. Theoretical implications of the empirical evidence are discussed.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1177/1362361310366314
Uncontrolled keywords: autism; physical self-awareness; psychological self-awareness; simulation theory; theory of own mind
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Psychology
Depositing User: David Williams
Date Deposited: 28 May 2013 09:49 UTC
Last Modified: 16 Nov 2021 10:11 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/34004 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

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