Cryptanalysis of Syverson's Rational Exchange Protocol

Alcaide, Almudena and Estevez Tapiador, Juan and Hernandez-Castro, Julio C. and Ribagorda, Arturo Cryptanalysis of Syverson's Rational Exchange Protocol. International Journal of Network Security, 7 (2). pp. 151-156. ISSN 2152-5064. (Access to this publication is currently restricted. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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The notion of rational exchange introduced by Syverson in 1998 is a particularly interesting alternative when an efficient scheme for fair exchange is required but the existence of a trusted third party simply cannot be assumed. A rational exchange protocol cannot provide true fairness, but it ensures that rational –i.e. self-interested– parties would have no reason to deviate from the protocol. In this paper, we identify some weaknesses in Syverson’s rational exchange protocol which were neither detected by the original author nor by subsequent analysis. After presenting some attacks, we indicate how the scheme should be modified to overcome these vulnerabilities. We also provide a formal analysis of our enhancement using BAN logic.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled keywords: Cryptanalysis, fair exchange, rational exchange, replay attacks
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics (inc Computing science) > QA 75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Divisions: Faculties > Sciences > School of Computing > Security Group
Depositing User: Julio Hernandez-Castro
Date Deposited: 24 Oct 2012 13:29 UTC
Last Modified: 26 Apr 2018 09:55 UTC
Resource URI: (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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